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ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARIES OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR SPEECH IN THE CYBERSPACE
FRONTIER: RENO v. ACLU
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet presents a unique problem in regulating certain
types of speech, because of its unique nature.1 Unlike radio and
other mediums, the Internet is not controlled by a single entity,
rather, it is a decentralized, self-maintained series of links between
various computers and computer networks. 2 This giant network in-
terconnects what is estimated to be as many as 40 million people
around the world.3 The Internet is a conduit for an almost infinite
1. See Robyn Forman Pollack, Creating Standards of a Global Community: Regulat-
ing Pornography on the Internet - An International Concern, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 467 ("'Almost like posters on telephone poles, the Internet appears to defy
regulation.' Messages pass from computer system to computer systems in millisec-
onds, crossing borders with incredible speed.").
The concern about indecent material in cyberspace is fueled by the abil-
ity of the new technology to transform the way individuals communicate.
The Internet is frightening because "it is a cheap, easily accessible means
of communication that is almost free of social control." It is a medium in
which anyone with access to a computer and an Internet account can be a
publisher, reader, and distributer of information. Cyberspace transcends
geographic boundaries and cannot distinguish between adults and chil-
dren. Regulations used to deny access to indecent material to children
in the physical world are ineffective in cyberspace. Thus both govern-
ment regulators and private citizens have attempted to broaden the reach
of existing obscenity laws and draft new legislation in order to regulate
online content.
Anita Vasudevan, Sex, Laws, and Cyberspace: Freedom and Censorship on the Frontiers of
the Online Revolution, 10 I-IAuv. J. L. & TECH. 715 (1997).
2. See ACLU v. Reno (Reno 1), 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (1996). The Internet
is not administered by any one entity. Id. at 832. The Internet is essentially a
system of hundreds of thousands of individual computer operators who are using a
common date transfer protocol to exchange information with other computer
users. See id. "There is no centralized storage location, control point, or communi-
cations channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a
single entity to control all of the information controlled on the Internet." Id.; see
also Alan Lewine, Making Cyberspace Safe for Children: A First Amendment Analysis of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 78, 81 (1996)
("[T] he Internet comprises a new type of communications medium, not analogous
to existing broadcast or telephonic media. Neither the Communications Decency
Act nor the courts have established a constitutional basis for federal regulation of
this medium, as they have in the broadcast arena and in certain narrow areas of
basic telephone service.").
3. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 831. It is very difficult to apply traditional legal
precepts to this new form of media because of its global character. See Jose I.
Rojas, The Internet and Content Control: Liability of Creators, Distributors and End-Users,
471 PLI/PAT 203, 206-07 (1997). Legal principals such as copyrights which are
(429)
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amount of informative material ranging in topics as broad as the
imagination. Among such material, one can find sexually explicit
material ranging from "the modestly titillating to the hardest
core."4
As a result, concern has grown over regulating content availa-
bility among children who are using the Internet at an increasing
rate due to access at home, in school and in public libraries.5 This
problem is compounded by a presidential administration which
promotes Internet use among children.6 It is this use among chil-
dren, combined with the types of material that can be accessed over
the Internet, that led Congress to enact the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 (CDA).7
One of the problems with regulating certain types of speech
over the Internet is that regulation in this arena is fairly new.8 As a
result, Congress is left with very few guidelines in determining the
amount of protection that the First Amendment will provide sexual
content found on the Internet.9 Those who have been affected by
various provisions of the CDA have challenged it several times on
the basis that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. 10
widely accepted within the United States, may be treated differently in foreign
countries; "what may be deemed pornographic in Tennessee or Germany may not
be offensive to community standards in New York or California." Id. at 206. Many
commentators have urged countries to avoid applying their differing and often
conflicting laws to this new medium. See id. at 206-07.
4. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
5. See id. at 832-33. At the district court level, the three judge panel made
numerous findings of fact as to the accessibility of the Internet. At home, children
can access the Internet through one of the major commercial "online service prov-
iders." See id. at 833. These commercial providers include companies such as
America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft Network or Prodigy. See id. Children
now also have the ability to access the Internet at many local libraries. See id. Many
libraries also offer telephone modem access to the library's computers. See id.
These computers are often linked to the Internet and thus allow a patron to access
the Internet through the library computers without ever actually entering the li-
brary. See id.
6. See Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers, 13
No. 7 COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1996).
7. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (Supp. 1997). The "Communications Decency Act of
1996" is officially referred to as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Star. 56; see also Reno v. ACLU (Reno I), 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2337
(1997). The primary components of this Act have absolutely nothing to do with
the Internet, but rather deal with the "rapid deployment of new telecommunica-
tion technologies." See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2338.
8. See Lewine, supra note 2, at 81.
9. See id.
10. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Reno I, 929 F. Supp.
824 (challenging constitutionality of § 223(a)(1) which criminalized knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent material to minors, and § 223(d) of Act which
prohibits knowingly sending to person under age of 18 any message that depicts or
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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This Note looks at Reno v. ACLU (Reno I), which invalidated
certain provisions of the CDA, holding that they restricted various
types of constitutionally protected speech." Reno II serves as a
benchmark regarding the amount of protection provided sexually
explicit material on the Internet and establishes a standard which
future legislation must meet in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny.1 2
This Note begins with an analysis of the background of rele-
vant law pertaining to the issues raised in Reno II.13 The next sec-
tion examines the state of the Internet prior to the enactment of
the CDA in an attempt to show what fueled Congress to enact the
legislation. 14 The Note then looks in-depth at the reasoning be-
hind the Court's decision, and critically analyzes the Court's reason-
ing. The Note concludes by looking at the impact of Reno II on
future legislation of the Internet, as well as the rippling effect Reno
H may have upon the regulation of other types of media. 15
II. BACKGROUND SECTION
Only recently has Congress attempted to regulate materials
that are accessible over the Internet.16 Congress has, however,
dealt at great lengths with the issue of limiting obscene and inap-
propriate materials in other mediums over the last fifty years.' 7 It is
this regulation that has produced an abundance of case law that is
applicable in many ways to the challenges made over the CDA.
In order to take a closer look into the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Reno II, it is important to understand how the Court has his-
torically treated similar types of legislation. First, this section begins
describes sexual or excretory activities in "a patently offensive way as measured by
contemporary community standards").
11. See infra notes 148-256 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's analysis in Reno II.
12. See infra notes 297-310 for a discussion of the impact of Reno II.
13. See infra notes 16-109 for a discussion of the background of the law in-
volved in the First Amendment protection of various forms of medium.
14. See infra notes 110-47 for a discussion of the Internet and the facts lead-
ing up to Congress enacting the CDA.
15. See infra notes 297-310 for the impact that this case will have on the future
of the law in this area.
16. See Lewine, supra note 2, at 80.
17. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374 (1996) (regulating "patently offensive" and "indecent" programming on
cable television); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(regulating obscene and indecent telephone answering messages); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulating transmission of explicit material over
radio).
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by examining how the court has treated prohibition of obscene or
indecent materials. 18 Second, this section looks at how the type of
medium which Congress is regulating affects the amount of protec-
tion that is provided under the First Amendment. 19 Third, this sec-
tion analyzes the language of the CDA and discusses some of the
challenges made to the statute since its enactment.20
A. Attempts at Restricting the Dissemination of Obscene and
Indecent Material
One of the first Supreme Court cases to explicitly deal with
whether the First Amendment afforded obscene material constitu-
tional protection was Roth v. California.21 In attempting to confine
the types of speech afforded protection by the First Amendment,
Roth notes that the phrasing of the First Amendment was not in-
tended to protect every single utterance. 22 Rather, protected areas
of speech only include ideas having the slightest redeeming social
importance. 23 The court went on to hold that "unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion - have the full protection of the guaranties, unless exclud-
able because they encroach upon the limited area of more impor-
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. Roth v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The applicable statute in Roth was
a federal obscenity standard that made the mailing of material that is "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy.., or other publication of an indecent character" a crimi-
nal offense. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 480. The appellant contested the constitutional-
ity of the statute under the due process clause arguing that it did not contain an
ascertainable standard of guilt. See id. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the constitution does not require a legislature to create impossible standards
in regulating against obscenity. See id. at 491. All that is required of such a regula-
tion is that it provide a sufficient warning of the proscribed conduct "when mea-
sured by common understanding and practices . . . ." See id. at 491. Justice
Brennan stated that the fact "[t]hat there may be marginal cases in which it is
difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is
no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal of-
fense . . . ." Id. at 491-92 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947)).
The holding in Roth was discussed and distinguished in Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), where the Court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments "recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem of
obscenity." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563. The relevant governmental interest, however,
is "in the regulation of commercial distribution of obscene material" and that "the
assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitu-
tional protections." Id. at 563. Stanley specifically held the "First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a
crime." Id. at 568.
22. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
23. See id.
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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tant interests." 24 Conversely, the Court felt that obscenity had no
social importance, and was therefore outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. 2
5
In Roth, Justice Brennan defined the Court's test for obscenity
as "whether to the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest. '2 6 The Supreme Court's test
for obscenity has been refined several times since its introduction
in Roth, but Brennan's test undeniably serves as the predecessor of
the current obscenity test.2 7
24. Id. at 484.
25. See id. The decision in Roth built upon the ruling of a prior Supreme
Court decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky
distinguished the types of speech that were not provided protection under the
First Amendment because they are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as to step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity." Id. at 572. "In keeping with the reasoning of Chaplinsky, the Court denied
constitutional protection to obscene materials on the basis of their lack of social
value[.]" See generally Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications Decency Act of
1996, 7 DEPAuL-LCAJ. ART & ENr. L. 336 (1997) (stating that idea of low-value
speech was first discussed in Chaplinsky, where Court labeled certain speech, in-
cluding fighting words, profanity, libel and lewd obscene words, as unworthy of
First Amendment protection); Donald T. Stepka, Obscenity On-Line: A Transactional
Approach to Computer Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CoRNEL L. REv. 905,
915 (1997).
One of the pioneer cases in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that
states had an interest in regulating obscene material was Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Chief Justice Burger highlighted several state interests
which could be furthered by regulation of obscene materials. Among these inter-
ests are: (1) exposure of children and unconsenting adults; (2) the quality of pub-
lic life and the community environment; (3) the "tone of commerce in the great
city centers;" and (4) "possibly, the public safety itself." Paris Adult Theatre I, 413
U.S. at 57.
26. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. Webster's Dictionary defines prurient as "having or
easily susceptible to lascivious thoughts or desires." WEBSTER's NEW WoRLD DIC-
TIONARY 1829 (3d ed. 1976).
27. See Stepka, supra note 25, at 915. There were several problems with the
test for obscenity which was set forth in Roth. See id. at 914. Among such problems
are the difficulty in interpreting the term "prurient interest," determining whether
"community standards" was referring to local standards or national standards, and
"deciding whether the lack of social value of materials was a reason to prohibit
them once they were found obscene or was part of the test for obscenity." Id.; see
also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing revision of Roth test set in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
The difficulty in determining what standards the "community standards" as-
pect of the test was applying to can be seen in comparing two different Supreme
Court cases, Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), and Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964). See Stepka, supra note 25, at 916. In Manual, justice Harlan
interpreted the Roth "community standards" provision to apply to a national stan-
dard. See Manuai 370 U.S. at 478. His reasoning was based on the belief that a
local standard would have "the intolerable consequence of denying some sections
of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might
433
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One year following Roth, the Supreme Court once again dealt
with a state attempting to regulate the distribution of obscene
materials in Ginsberg v. New York 28 The basis of the appellant's con-
stitutional challenge in Ginsberg relied on the assertion that the de-
nial to minors of material condemned within a New York statute,
where the same material was not deemed obscene for those persons
over the age of seventeen, "constitute [d] an unconstitutional depri-
vation of protected liberty."29 The issue before the Court was
whether it was constitutional for a state to assure minors a more
restrictive right than the similar right provided to adults in deter-
mining what sexual material they were permitted to read or see. 30
The Court rejected the appellant's argument noting that even
where there appears to be an invasion of protected freedoms, "the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches be-
yond the scope of its authority over adults ... ."31 The Court em-
phasized the independent interest of a state in protecting the well
being of its youth.3 2
be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency." Id. at 488.
This reasoning expounded upon the reasoning of Harlan in the Jacobellis case, but
Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent, urged that the Court adopt a local standard.
See Stepka, supra note 25, at 915.
Chief Justice Warren in his dissent urged the adoption of a local stan-
dard, arguing that there is "no provable 'national standard,"' and that
because "communities throughout the Nation are in fact diverse," it is
natural that material deemed obscene in the community against the
rights of individuals, and worried that no nationwide standard could ac-
commodate the diversity of local cultures in determining the correct
balance.
Id. at 916-17.
28. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The fact situation of Ginsberg
involved the owner of a luncheonette, in Long Island, who was convicted of selling
"girlie" magazines in violation of a New York state criminal statute. See id. at 632.
In reliance upon the decision in Redrup v. State of New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1966),
the Court stated that the "girlie" magazines involved in Ginsberg were not obscene
for adults. See id. at 634.
29. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
30. See id. at 631.
31. See id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth of Mass., 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944)). The Court in Ginsberg held that the well-being of its children falls
within a state's constitutional power to regulate. See id. at 639. The state therefore
has an interest "to protect the welfare of children and to see that they are 'safe-
guarded from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free and independ-
ent well-developed men and citizens.'" Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at
165). The first rationale for this is based on the basic premise in our society that
parents have authority in their households and they are entitled to laws by the state
to help in performing this responsibility. See id. The second rationale is that the
state has an independent interest in the well being of its children. See id. at 640.
32. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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One of the most important principles to come out of Ginsberg is
the Supreme Court's interpretation of when a state may extend
such protection to minors. In discussing this subject, Brennan
states that for a state to protect such interests in minors, the law
need only be able to withstand the rational basis test.33 The court
relied on Roth, noting that obscenity is not a form of expression
that is provided protection under the First Amendment.3 4 Thus,
obscenity may be suppressed without the legislature having to show
the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.3 5
Prior to Ginsberg, the Supreme Court dealt with a Michigan reg-
ulation which attempted to prevent certain obscene materials from
being accessible to minors. 36 The issue in Butler v. Michigan, how-
ever, did not revolve around whether a legislature could prevent
such obscene materials from being obtained by minors, but rather
focused on the validity of a statute that extends beyond protecting
minors and effects adults as well.3 7 As a result of this overbreadth,
33. See id. at 641. The Court states that for it to uphold the state statute ex-
cluding material defined as obscenity, the Court need only say that it was not irra-
tional for the state legislature to find that exposure to the materials prohibited by
the statute is harmful to minors. See id.
Strict scrutiny, however, is the appropriate test to apply where there is a re-
striction on constitutionally protected speech, such as speech that is "indecent" or
"patently offensive." See Greg Ishkander, American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
Prohibiting the Transmissions of Obscene or Indecent Material and Patently Offensive Com-
munications to Persons Under the Age of 18 Violate the First Amendment, 6 B.U. PUB INT.
L.J. 816 (1997). The government must therefore show that it has a compelling
interest behind enacting the legislation and that the act is tailored narrowly to
meet that interest. See id.
In Denver Area, the Court struck down § 10(b) and § 10(c) of the Cable Act of
1992. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). These sections required leased access channel oper-
ators to block "patently offensive" and "indecent" programing. See id. The court
held that this was an unconstitutional ban imposed on speech protected by the
First Amendment. See id. In this case the court did not apply strict scrutiny or the
rational basis test; rather addressed whether the restrictions "addresse[d] an ex-
tremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an
unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Id. at 2385. The Court in Shea v. Reno
clarified the reasoning behind the court, refusing to apply strict scrutiny in Denver
Area. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The decision was based
upon the pervasiveness of cable television in the home and particularly its accessi-
bility to children. See id. The court went on to say that there is no question that
strict scrutiny is the test to apply when dealing with the Internet. See id.
34. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635.
35. See id. at 635.
36. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
37. See Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. Michigan Penal Code, Comp. Laws Section
343, 750.343 (Supp. 1954) provides:
Any person who shall import, print, publish, sell, possess with the intent
to sell, design, prepare, loan, give away, distribute or offer for sale, any
book, magazine, newspaper, writing, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper,
print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, includ-
7
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the Court held that the legislation was not restricted to the evil
which it was intended to prevent.3 This being the case, the
Supreme Court, led by Justice Frankfurter, stated that Michigan
had essentially "burn[ed] the house to roast the pig," and accord-
ingly, a state could not reduce the adult population to reading only
material that was fit for children. 39
The above mentioned cases clearly began to define certain lim-
itations upon a legislature's ability to regulate the accessibility of
sexually explicit materials to children. The real challenge to legisla-
tures came in limiting such legislation to children while avoiding
placing unreasonable restrictions upon the adult population.40 It
was not until 1973, in Miller v. California, that the Court set forth a
test to apply in determining when the language of a statute that
regulated materials available to children would withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.41 In Miller, the Court was confronted with a Califor-
nia statute which stated that any individual who knowingly sent into
the state, with an intent to "distribute or to exhibit or offer to dis-
tribute any obscene matter [was] guilty of a misdemeanor." 42  In
ing any recordings, containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious lan-
guage, or obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures or
descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved immoral
acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or shall
introduce into any family, school or place of education or shall buy, pro-
cure, receive or have in his possession, any such book, pamphlet, maga-
zine, newspaper, writing, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing,
photograph, publication or other thing, either for the purpose of sale,
exhibition, loan or circulation, or with intent to introduce the same into
any family, school or place of education, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id.
38. See Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
39. See id. at 383. In restricting the types of material that were accessible to
adults as well as children, the court arbitrarily restricted one of the liberties pro-
tected for an individual under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See id. at 383-84.
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth of Mich-
igan statute which attempted to limit accessibility of obscene materials to minors).
41. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller involved a man who
conducted a mass mailing of brochures in an attempt to advertise his books. See id.
at 16. These brochures were sent to persons who had not requested the brochures
and contained pictures and drawings that "very explicitly depict[ed] men and wo-
men in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with geni-
tals often prominently displayed." Id. at 18. The titles of the books that were
advertised within the brochures were titled "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Or-
gies Illustrated" and "Marital Intercourse." See id. The defendant in Miller was
subsequently arrested when such materials were sent to unwilling recipients who in
no way requested these materials. See id.
42. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (citing Cal. Amended Stats. 1969, c. 249, § 1, at
598). The pertinent part of the statute reads as follows:
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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addressing the ability of a state to regulate in this area, the Court
agreed that a state has the right to prevent the distribution of such
material when "the mode of disseminations carries with it a signifi-
cant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or
of exposure to juveniles."43
The main issue presented before the Court in Miller, however,
focused on the amount of detail required by a state when regulat-
ing obscene material in order to avoid impinging on the First
Amendment rights of individuals subject to such regulation. 44
While acknowledging that the state interest in regulating obscene
material is compelling, such a statute must be confined in its
scope. 45 The state legislature must avoid the suppression of materi-
als which are constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.46
In confirming the notion set forth in Roth that obscene materials
§ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing,
exhibiting, distributing or possessing within the state
(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings
or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in
this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to
distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to ex-
hibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misde-
meanor ....
§311. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(a) 'Obscene' means that to the average person, applying contempo-
rary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a
whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in
nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor or description or representation of such matters and
is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
(b) 'Matter' means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed
or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion pic-
ture, or other pictorial representation or any statute or other figure,
or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical
reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or
materials.
(c) 'Person' means any individual, partnership, firm, association,
corporation, or other legal entity.
(d) 'Distribute' means to transfer possession of, whether with or
without consideration.
(e)'Knowingly' means having knowledge that the matter is obscene.
§ 311 (e) of the California Penal Code was amended on June 25, 1969 as
follows:
(e) 'Knowingly' means being aware of the character of the matter.
Id.
43. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
44. See id. at 24.
45. See id. at 19-20.
46. See id. at 23-24. But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)
(holding that invalidation of statutes is inappropriate unless substantial over-
breadth and no limiting construction can be given to statute).
9
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are provided no constitutional protection under the First Amend-
ment, the court refined the Roth "obscenity test."
Miller established a three factor test that a court is to apply in
establishing the validity of a statute restricting obscene material. 47
The first guideline is whether the average person applying contem-
porary community standards would find that the regulation, when
considered in its totality, appeals to the prurient interest.4 The
second guideline to apply is whether "the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law." 49 Finally, the trier of fact must determine
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
47. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
48. See id. at 24 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489)). The issue of what community standards should be applied
in the Miller test, in its application to messages sent over a computer bulletin
board, was addressed in United States v Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). This
bulletin board contained thousands of pornographic images. See Thomas, 74 F.3d
at 705. This material was downloaded onto a computer in Memphis, where the
operators of the bulletin board were charged with the distribution of obscene
materials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465. See id. at 705-06. The Tennessee federal
court applied the Miller test, applying the community standards of Memphis, Ten-
nessee, rather than Milpitas, California from where the bulletin board was located.
See id. at 710-11. The court applied the community standards of Memphis based
on the notion that "obscenity is determined by the standards of the community
where the trial takes place." See id. at 711. While the obscene material here was
transferred over a computer bulletin board and not technically over the Internet,
commentators have noted that the technological distinction is immaterial. See
Michael W. Sanford & MichaelJ. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1146 n.41 (1996).
49. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. At the trial court level in Miller, both the prosecu-
tion and the defense assumed that the relevant "community standards" to be ap-
plied were to be those of the state of California, as opposed to some hypothetical
national standard. See id. At the appellate level, the appellant raised for the first
time that the applicable standards to apply should have been a national standard,
stating that application of the state standard was a violation of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. See id. at 30-32. ChiefJustice Burger disagreed, pointing to
his dissenting opinion in Jacobellis stating that "[n]othing in the First Amendment
requires that ajury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national stan-
dards' when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a
matter of fact." Id. at 31.
Chief Justice Burger speaks directly to the issue dispelling the argument that
was presented over whether a local or national community standard should be the
relevant standard in applying the obscenity test. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. Chief
Justice Burger states:
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limita-
tions on the powers of the States do not vary from community to commu-
nity, but this does not mean that there are, or should be, fixed, uniform
national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is
'patently offensive.' These are essentially questions of fact ....
Id. at 30; see also Donald T. Stepka, supra note 25, at 918 (stating that it is unrealis-
tic and not constitutionally sound for different communities around country to
have to comply with other community standards and attitudes; legislature should
not try to force such uniformity).
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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political or scientific value.50 The purpose of these qualifications is
to provide a precise definition that will give fair notice to the sup-
plier of obscene material that such distribution may result in crimi-
nal prosecution. 51
The above cases illustrate how different classifications of
speech have been treated by the Supreme Court under the First
Amendment. Having looked at how different types of speech are
provided different amounts of protection, it is important to observe
how identical speech has been treated differently depending upon
the medium by which it is being transmitted.5 2 These distinctions
between mediums are based on different inherent characteristics of
each respective medium. 53 This Note now takes a look at the
Court's treatment of differing forms of medium. 54
B. Historical Treatment of Other Medium
Throughout the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has dealt
with legislation attempting to restrict obscene and indecent mate-
rial over various media. Distinctions have been created within these
different cases for determining the varying degrees of First Amend-
ment protection to be provided to specific types of communica-
tions. This section takes a look at these cases and the reasoning
developed in determining the varying standards.
In 1978 the Supreme Court dealt with the regulation of ex-
plicit material on the radio in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.55 The is-
sue before the Court dealt with whether the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had the power to regulate
sexually related speech that was not within the legal definition of
obscenity.56 This issue was presented when a radio station con-
50. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
51. See id. at 27 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 491-92).
52. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969)
(noting differences in new media forms may lead to differences in First Amend-
ment standards applied to them).
53. See Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are? Cap-
tive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 51, 65-66 (1996) ("The presence of certain features, such as the number
of channels available to all speakers and the pervasive nature of the medium, may
justify the appropriate level of restriction over the content of protected speech.
Historically, the Supreme Court granted the print media virtually unlimited First
Amendment protection under the hierarchy of First Amendment interests.").
54. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (regulat-
ing programs on cable television); Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, Inc., 492
U.S. 115 (1989) (regulating telephone answering messages); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulating content of radio broadcasts).
55. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
56. See id. at 745.
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trolled by Pacifica, broadcasted at approximately two o'clock in the
afternoon, a twelve minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words."57
The FCC responded to the broadcast by regulating the "patently
offensive" language in a manner similar to the law of nuisance. 58
The FCC placed restrictions on the time of day in which such lan-
guage could be broadcast instead of imposing a complete prohibi-
tion on indecent language. 59 The goal of these restrictions was to
limit the broadcast of such pieces to the times of day that children
were not likely to be listening to the radio. 60 The FCC found the
power to create the regulation in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,61 which forbids
the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communications," and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), 62 which requires
the FCC to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in
the public interest."
The Supreme Court took steps in its decision towards distin-
guishing the types of material that could be regulated over different
forms of media.63 While the relevant broadcast lacked literary,
political or scientific value, the Court held that even the most offen-
sive phrases still maintain some protection under the First Amend-
ment.64 The most important distinction made by the Court,
however, was that while such language is afforded some constitu-
tional protection, "the constitutional protection accorded to a com-
munication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory
57. See id. at 726. The broadcast was a recording of comic satirist George
Carlin listing those words and various colloquialisms that he described as those
that could never be said over the airwaves. See id. at 751. A man who was driving in
his car with his child at the time reported hearing the broadcast to the FCC. See id.
at 726.
58. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
59. See id. at 733.
60. See id. at 749.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.). The statute provides that "[w]hoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both." Id.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)(1934). The statute provides in part "[e]xcept as else-
where provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires, shall-(g) . . . generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." Id.
63. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 & n.2. Some of the reasons are as follows: (1)
children have access to radios unsupervised by adults; (2) radios may be found in
the home where persons have an extra privacy interest and should be protected
from intrusions; (3) unconsenting adults may tune into an offensive radio pro-
gram without any forewarning; and (4) scarcity of spectrum space. See id. at 731
(citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
64. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
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language need not be the same in every context. 65 Thus, in order
to determine when such language is afforded constitutional protec-
tion, it becomes important to look at the context in which the
words are used.6 6 The Court proceeded to uphold the FCC's regu-
lation in Pacifica, denying constitutional protection, because the
speech was broadcast over the radio airwaves during the middle of
the afternoon. 67
In reaching its conclusion, the Court distinguished between ra-
dio and other forms of media. The first distinction involved the
limited amount of constitutional protection historically received by
the radio industry.68 For example, radio broadcasters are licensed
by the FCC. This license, however, is subject to revocation by the
Commission if they should decide that such action would serve
"public interest, convenience, and necessity."6 9 Aside from this his-
torical treatment, the Court noted several other reasons why radio
should be provided a lower level of protection than most other
forms of media. First, radio has a pervasive presence in the lives of
Americans as it confronts them not only in public, but also in the
privacy of their own homes.70 Second, there is no warning of offen-
sive material as there is with a book or magazine, the listener has no
indication of the language about to come over the airwaves until
they have already heard it.71 Third, children have the ability of lis-
tening to the radio even before they are capable of reading. 72
While recognizing the significance of these reasons, the Court does
note the narrowness of its holding to radio during the middle of
the day.73 A court may have come to a different conclusion if the
65. Id. at 746-47.
66. See id. at 747-48.
67. See id. at 750.
68. See id. at 747.
69. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
70. See id; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (noting that
speaker's interests may overcome interests of unwilling audience when outside pri-
vacy of home).
71. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
72. See id. at 749.
73. See id. at 750. The Court limits its holding to the situation and variables
presented before it. See id. The Court specifically notes that its decision rests en-
tirely on the nuisance rationale applied in the facts before it. See id. Justice Ste-
vens states "The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of
day was emphasized by the commission. The content of the program in which
language is used will also affect the composition of the audience, and differences
between radio, television, and perhaps closed circuit transmissions, may also be
relevant." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
13
Merchant: Establishing the Boundaries of First Amendment Protection for Spe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
442 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
same content was transmitted over a different medium or commu-
nicated at a different time.74
Similar issues were brought up in the 1989 case of Sable Commu-
nications of California, Inc. v. FCC.75 This case involved a challenge
to the 1988 amendments of § 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934 which placed an outright ban on obscene and indecent inter-
state commercial telephone communications. 7 6 Sable Communica-
tions was a Los Angeles based company who in 1983 began offering
sexually oriented prerecorded messages over the telephone. 77
These messages are commonly referred to as "dial-a-porn. '7 8 Sable
brought suit in district court in 1988, contesting § 223(b) which
served as a blanket prohibition on obscene and indecent interstate
phone messages. 79 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of this prohibition as it applied to obscenity, noting that the First
Amendment does not extend to obscene speech.80
74. See id.; supra note 73.
75. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V.).
77. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-18.
78. See id. at 118.
79. See id. The relevant parts of the statute at the time of the Sable challenge
read as follows:
(b) (1) Whoever knowingly -
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communi-
cation, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording de-
vice) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial
purposes to any person, regardless of. whether the maker of such
communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), "shall be fined
not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both."
47 U.S.C. § 223.
80. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 125. Sable also presented a challenge to the statute
stating that it creates an impermissible national standard of obscenity which forces
message senders to adapt their messages to the least tolerant community's stan-
dards. See id. The Court rejected this argument stating that "[a]s we have said
before, the fact that 'distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected
to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which
they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional be-
cause of the failure of application of uniform national standards of obscenity."' Id.
(quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)). The Court stated
that if Sable has an audience of several different communities, in which some view
Sable's material as obscene and others do not, Sable bears the burden of comply-
ing with the communities who do view the material as obscene. See id. Further, the
Court stated that "[w]hile Sable may be forced to incur some costs in developing
and implementing a system for screening the locale of incoming calls, there is no
constitutional impediment to enacting a law which may impose such costs on a
medium electing to provide these messages." Id.
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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The Court then proceeded to deal with whether that portion
of the statute prohibiting the dissemination of "indecent" messages
was constitutional. 81 As discussed previously in Pacifica, the Court
concluded that sexual expression, which is indecent but not ob-
scene, is still afforded protection under the First Amendment. 82
The government, however, may still regulate this type of speech if
in doing so it furthers a compelling governmental interest by the
least restrictive means of achieving this compelling interest.8
3
The Court has repeatedly held that protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors is a compelling government in-
terest.84 In order to legislate this area of the law, such legislation
must be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny in that "it must do
so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment free-
doms. ''8 5 The legislature must not only show that it has a compel-
ling interest, it must also show that the means are tailored as
narrowly as possible to meet that interest.8 6
81. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 125.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 126 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982)).
85. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
620 (1976) (holding invalid municipal ordinance requiring advance written notice
to police of those desiring to solicit from house to house invalid due to vague-
ness)); see also Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 44 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) (holding ordinance prohibiting door to door solicitation of contributions
by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of contributions for
"charitable purposes" as overly broad and thus in violation of First and Fourth
Amendments); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(holding Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting specified business corpora-
tions from contributing for purpose of influencing vote submitted to voters as un-
constitutional and in violation of First Amendment).
86. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. The FCC set forth the argument that the only
means of restricting minors from having access to these dial-a-porn messages was a
complete ban. See id. at 129. The court rejected this argument because on January
15, 1988, in Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that new regulations created by the FCC requiring the use of access
codes, along with credit card payments and scrambled messages (where only an
adult would be able to purchase a component to unscramble the message) as de-
fenses to § 223(b) for dial-a-porn providers was a feasible means of meeting the
states compelling interest of protecting minors. See id. at 128 (citing Carlin Com-
munications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1988)). With these means being
effective, the Court stated that a complete ban was not necessary. See id. The FCC
argued, however, that such means were not effective and minors could still be
provided access to communications to which they should be shielded. See id. The
Supreme Court stated that there was no congressional support to back up this
assertion and therefore no justification for concluding that there is no constitu-
tionally acceptable less restrictive means. See id.
443
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The Court in Sable brought up several distinctions between the
total ban presented before them and the regulations that were up-
held in Pacifica.87 The most distinguishing factor between Pacifica
and Sable was the type of medium involved. As previously discussed,
Pacifica involved radio broadcasting.88 Radio broadcasting is perva-
sive in nature in that it invades the privacy of one's own home and
spreads its messages without any warning as to the content of the
messages which are about to come.89 The telephone is very differ-
ent in that affirmative steps actually need to be taken before an
offensive message can be played.90 "Unlike, an unexpected out-
burst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places
a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it
prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it."91 The
second important distinction between these two cases is that
Pacifica did not involve a complete ban as in Sable, but rather ex-
pressly limited its restriction to broadcasts played over that specific
medium and at that time of the day.9 2 The holding in Sable clearly
demonstrates the narrowness of Pacifica.9 3 It indicates that the ex-
tent that indecent communications can be limited without such re-
striction being held unconstitutional is dependent upon the type of
medium involved and the time and context of the material being
transmitted.9 4
C. The Legislation of Obscene and Indecent Material over
the Internet
In an attempt to regulate the types of material that may by dis-
persed over the Internet, Congress adopted the Communications
87. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969)
(noting that different medium may lead to differing amounts of protection pro-
vided under First Amendment).
88. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
89. See id. at 748-49.
90. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
91. Id. The telephone does not have the same problem as radio, in that there
is no captive audience. See id. The context of "dial-a-porn" services is very different
as the person wants the service as opposed to the unexpecting listener who is taken
by surprise. See id. "Unlike, an unexpected outburst on the radio broadcast, the
message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive
or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it."
Id.
92. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
93. See id. at 128.
94. See William Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, 482 PLI/
PAT 33, 40 (1997). Each medium has its own characteristics which include advan-
tages as well as problems. See id. How the First Amendment is applied to each
medium should reflect the uniqueness of that medium. See id.
[Vol. 5: p. 429
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Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).9 5 The CDA was intended to protect
minors from being exposed to harmful material over the Internet.
It criminalizes the knowing transmission of "obscene" or "indecent"
messages to any recipient that is younger than eighteen years of
age.9 6 Section 223(d) of the Act criminalizes "the knowing sending
or displaying to a person under eighteen of any message that in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as mea-
sured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs. '97 The CDA also contains several "safe harbor"
95. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (Supp. 1997). The Communications Decency Act of
1996 is actually Title V of The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56. The primary purpose of this act was to reduce regulation and en-
courage the rapid deployment of new communication technologies. See Reno II,
117 S.Ct. at 2337-38. The major components of the statute have nothing to do
with the Internet. See id. The original purpose of the act was to promote competi-
tion in the local telephone service market, the multi-channel video market and the
market for over the air broadcasting. See id. at 2337-38.
96. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1) (B) (ii) (Supp. 1997). This section of the Act pro-
hibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient
under 18 years of age. It provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever -
(1) In interstate or foreign communicationis - -
(b) by means of telecommunications device knowingly - -
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of "any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of
the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication;
(2) Knowingly permits any telecommunication facility under his con-
trol to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Tide 18,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. § 223(a).
97. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997). This section prohibits the knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to
a person under 18 years of age. It provides:
(d) Whoever -
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly -
(B) uses an interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, re-
quest, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of
such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined
under Tide 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. There are also two affirmative defenses, one that covers those who take "good
faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to
445
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provisions aimed at protecting persons from criminal prosecution
after they have taken the appropriate steps.98
prohibited communications. Id. § 223(e) (5) (A). The other defense covers those
who restrict access to covered material by requiring certain measures of verifying
age, such as tagging, verified credit card or an adult identification number or
code. Id. § 223(e) (5) (B).
98. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (Supp. 1997). The "safe harbor" provisions read as
follows:
(e) Defenses
In addition to other defenses available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) of
this section solely for providing access or connection to or from a
facility, system, or network not under that person's control, includ-
ing transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access
software, or other related capabilities that are incidental to providing
such access or connection that does not include the creation of the
content of the communication.
(2) The defenses provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall
not be applicable to a person who is a conspirator with an entity
actively involved in the creation or knowing distribution of commu-
nications that violate this section, or who knowingly advertises the
availability of such communications.
(3) The defenses provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall
not be applicable to a person who provides access or connection to a
facility, system, or network engaged in the violation of this section
that is owned or controlled by such a person.
(4) No employer shall be held liable under this section for the ac-
tions of an employee or agent unless the employee's or agent's con-
duct is within the scope of his or her employment or agency and the
employer (A) having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or rati-
fies such conduct, or (B) recklessly disregards such conduct.
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a) (1) (B) or
(d) of this section, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with
respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection
(a)(1)(B) that a person -
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropri-
ate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access
by minors to a communication specified in such subsections,
which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors
from such communications, including any method which is fea-
sible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number.
(6) The [Federal Communications] Commission may describe meas-
ures which are reasonable, effective, and appropriate to restrict ac-
cess to prohibited communications under subsection (d) of this
section. Nothing in this section authorizes the Commission to en-
force, or is intended to provide the Commission with the authority to
approve, sanction, or permit, the use of such measures. The Com-
mission shall have no enforcement authority over the failure to util-
ize such measures ....
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The constitutionality of the CDA was addressed for the first
time at the district court level in ACLU v. Reno (Reno 1).99 The
Supreme Court addressed this decision during the summer of 1997,
and it is the focus of this casenote.100 In the time between when
Reno I was decided at the district court level and when the appeal
was presented before the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of
the CDA was again addressed at the district court level in Shea v.
Reno.Y0 Shea addressed the constitutionality of the CDA in what it
felt was clearly a content-based restriction on First Amendment pro-
tected speech. 10 2 In Shea, a three judge panel, sitting in the South-
99. See 929 F. Supp. 824 (1996).
100. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
101. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Plaintiff was the editor,
publisher and partial owner of a newspaper that was disseminated solely by elec-
tronic means. See id. at 922. Plaintiff filed suit in response to the enactment of the
CDA on the grounds that § 223(d) of the Act because it was (1) invalid due to the
vagueness of the statute in that it did not give citizens a sufficient guideline as to
what types of material would violate the act; and (2) the CDA was overbroad in that
it affects a broader category of speech than necessary and particulary some consti-
tutionally protected speech among adults. See id. This case was first decided by a
three judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. See id. The three judge panel
held that the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of demonstrating that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague, but the statute was held to be overly broad as it
banned indecent speech between adults that is protected under the First Amend-
ment. See id. at 922. The main reason for the three judge panel finding that the
statute was overly broad was that compliance with the defense provisions under the
Act depended on actions by third party software manufacturers, who were not re-
quired to do anything under the statute. See id.; supra note 97 for defenses pro-
vided under the CDA.
Accordingly, the impossibility of complying with these affirmative defenses
makes § 223(d) overly broad and thus unconstitutional. See id.
102. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. The courts have distinguished two different
types of regulations, based on their purpose, that have had an effect on the First
Amendment freedom of speech. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance which banned adult motion pic-
ture theaters within 1,000 feet of any residential zones under First Amendment
time, place and manner analysis); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7
(1980) (holding Illinois statute that prohibited picketing of residences or dwellings
unconstitutional under First Amendment content analysis). Each type presents a
different First Amendment analysis. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47. It is essential to
know which analysis is applicable when analyzing different types of restrictions on
protected speech.
These two different forms of legislation are commonly referred to as "content-
based" and "content-neutral" categories of regulation. See id. The distinction is
very important, because the Court has continuously held that there is a presump-
tive violation of the First Amendment where a regulation is enacted for the pur-
poses of holding back speech based on the content of that speech. See id.; Carey,
447 U.S. 462-63 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Where a law or regulation is deemed "content-neutral" such as time, place and
manner regulations, these regulations are acceptable to the extent that they are
designed to serve a substantial government interest "and do not unreasonably limit
alternative avenues of communication." See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. These "con-
tent-neutral" regulations are without reference to the content of the speech that
19
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ern District of New York, rejected the plaintiffs initial challenge
that the provisions of § 223(d) were unconstitutional due to their
vagueness.1 0 3 The court noted that substantially identical language
has been validated in its application to other mediums and that
there was no reason for the court to make a distinction in its hold-
ing based on the relevant medium. 10 4 The court, however, did hold
the regulations affect, but rather the predominant purpose of the regulation is to
control the secondary effects which result from the regulated acts. See id.
In Renton, the city enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie
theaters within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwell-
ing, church, park or school. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43. Playtime Theatres, had
purchased two theaters in the area of Renton, and planned on converting these
two movie theaters into adult theaters. See id. Playtime filed an action stating that
the ordinance was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id.
The Court disagreed finding that the "predominant concerns" of the committee
who created the ordinance were the secondary effects of adult theaters, and were
not aimed at the content in the films themselves. See id. at 48. The Court stated
that if the ordinance was intended to restrict the content of speech at the theaters,
it would have attempted to close them or restrict their number rather than simply
limit their choice of location. See id.
103. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936. The court stated that a Federal Statute is
too vague and therefore a violation of the Fifth Amendment where an act fails to
give a "fair warning of what will give rise to criminal liability." See id. at 935. Vague-
ness may also violate the First Amendment where it creates a chilling effect on
speech as a result of the confusions created by the standards within a statute. See
id. The court upheld the statute in the face of the vagueness challenge based on
virtually identical language being upheld in Pacifica. See id. at 935-36 (citing
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726);John Matosky, Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N. Y. 1996). Section 223(d) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
A Total Ban on Constitutionally Protected Indecent Communication Among Adults, is Un-
constitutionally Overbroad, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 812 (1997).
The court stated that Internet providers are faced with the same level of diffi-
culty in complying with the community decency standards as publishers and broad-
casters. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937. The court specifically states that "liability for
violation of indecency restrictions has not been tied to the ability of a content
provider to marshal its resources to explore various community standards." Id.
The court supports its finding with the notion that distributors of material over the
Internet may be subject to varying community standards. See id. Due process re-
quires that a statute provide a person of ordinary intelligence the opportunity to
know what types of material the statute prohibits, not that it set a standard with
mathematical certainty. See id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972)).
The court refused to address the issue that since a provider has no idea where
its information is going that they must accordingly adapt the content of that mate-
rial to the least tolerant community. See id. at 938.
104. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. Invalidation of a statute due to overbreadth
is appropriate only where a statute is held to be substantially overbroad and no
limiting construction can be applied. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
612-13 (1973). Accordingly, the test applied by the court in Shea became whether
§ 223(d) of the CDA restricted speech that was constitutionally protected, and if
so, whether this category of speech affected was substantial in relation to the
amount of speech validly restricted. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. The court never
addressed this issue because it did not find it necessary to decide whether § 223(d)
reaches a significant amount of Internet material with serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. See id. at 940-41 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
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that the statute was substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid
on its face.10 5 The court based its findings on the fact that the af-
firmative defenses provided in § 223(e) (5) of the Act were unavaila-
ble to Internet providers, and thus the Act was not narrowly tailored
to meet the government's interest.10 6 The court declined to sever
the statute in the hopes of preventing complete invalidity due to a
fear of engaging in the practice ofjudicial legislation. 10 7 The court
105. The plaintiff, Shea, asserted that § 223(d) of the CDA was unconstitu-
tionally broad for two reasons. See id. at 940. First, he contended that the provi-
sion restricts a significant amount of material with literary, artistic, political or
scientific value and the government was unable to reveal any compelling interest
in restricting the availability of this material. See id. Secondly, Shea contended
that when the provision was considered together with the affirmative defenses pro-
vided under § 223(e) (5), it was not narrowly tailored and failed to preserve the
rights of adults to participate in several constitutionally protected forms of speech.
See id. The court reached its conclusion that the statute was overbroad by touching
on only the second of these claims. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940. The major issue
confronting the court here was that only if the § 223(5) affirmative defenses when
taken in connection with § 223(d) would allow adults to partake in constitutionally
protected indecent communications, the court could conclude that these provi-
sions were narrowly tailored to meet the government's compelling interest in re-
stricting access to these types of materials. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942. The court
concluded that current technology was unable to provide a means for Internet
providers to avail themselves of the affirmative defenses provided by the Act, and
accordingly, the statute was not narrowly tailored. See id. The court invalidated
the statute. See id.
106. See id. at 941. The court applied the strict scrutiny test in establishing
that § 223 was not narrowly tailored to meet the government's goals. See id. at 939.
In applying this test the court assumes that the government has a compelling inter-
est in protecting minors from all "patently offensive material." See Shea, 930 F.
Supp. at 941. The statute fails the strict scrutiny test, however, because of a lack of
means by which an adult may engage in constitutionally protected speech without
criminal liability. See id. at 942. The court based this decision on the notion that
even though the government may have a legitimate compelling interest, the state
may not regulate it if it turns out that the least restrictive regulation is unreasona-
ble when the limitations on speech from those regulations far outweigh the bene-
fits gained. See id. at 941.
107. See id. at 949. The government urged that the court recognize the "'ele-
mentary principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part
unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that
which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be re-
jected.'" Id. (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985)
(quoting Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (1881)). The court in this instance
found that the statute in no way made itself susceptible to a narrowing construc-
tion, and as such, the court could not take it upon itself to do so in fear of creating
'judicial legislation." See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 949-50. The limitation in the Shea
case that the court was referring to was a limitation of "any person" in § 223(d) to
be "any commercial provider," or something to that effect. Id. at 949. The court
held that doing so would be judicial legislation and accordingly refrained. See id.;
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 514 U.S. 1002 (1995) (refus-
ing to read nexus requirement into Ethics in Government Act stating that any
attempt by Court to redraft might not identify nexus Congress was seeking);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (refusing to construe
city ordinance narrowly in order to prevent invalidation).
449
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also refused a plea by the government to allow the statute to un-
dergo a gradual narrowing through a case by case analysis.' 08
Shea was the last case to deal with the constitutionality of the
CDA prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Reno 1.109 This Note
will take a look at the workings of the Internet to determine what
led Congress to enact the CDA.
III. FACTS
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was an attempt by
Congress to control the types of information that were available to
minors under the age of eighteen over what is commonly referred
to as "cyberspace." 110 Cyberspace includes everything from elec-
tronic mail, automatic mailing list services, news groups and chat
rooms, to the World Wide Web ("WWW"). 111 To understand what
led Congress to regulate this medium, it is essential to have an
understanding of the accessibility of these systems, the types of ma-
terial they may transmit and the available techniques and technolo-
gies for controlling the types of information transmitted over such
systems.
In the last ten years, the availability of Internet access has
grown tremendously. 112 Companies such as America Online, Com-
puserve, the Microsoft Network and Prodigy have made access to
the Internet readily available to anyone willing to pay a required
fee.' 1 3 These systems have provided links not only to their own ex-
108. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950. Broadrick involved a situation where the
Supreme Court confined its holding to the parties presented before it with the
expectation that future cases would narrow the statute's scope. See id. at 950 (cit-
ing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616). The one important aspect to the court's holding
there was that the court realized that the potential range of the law's unconstitu-
tional applications was not "substantial . . . in relation to the statutes plainly legiti-
mate sweep." See id. at 950 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616).
109. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
110. See id. at 2335, 2338.
111. The World Wide Web ("WWW") is a series of inter-connecting doc-
uments that are stored world-wide in different computers in the network.
When people refer to "surfing the 'Net," they are referring to jumping
from link to link, document to document. Users may access these docu-
ments by typing in a "URL," or Universal Resource Locator, or by search-
ing for content by key word. By accessing the Web, people can quickly
and flexibly view information in the form of text, images, sound and
animated video.
Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 7 DEPAuL-LCA
JOURNAL OF ART & ENTERTAINMENT L. 336 (1997).
112. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
113. See id. at 833. The major commercial online servers discussed in the
above text have almost twelve million subscribers to their services across the
United States. See id. While these provide organized content within their own pro-
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tensive proprietary networks, but have offered links to the even
larger resources of the Internet. 114 Aside from these systems which
may provide links from one's personal computer, there are several
other sources from which an individual can obtain access to the
Internet. 115 Most colleges and universities provide free access to
their students. In addition, many public libraries and other com-
munity facilities also provide free access. 116 Accessibility has ex-
panded even further as many Americans are now able to access the
Internet from work.1 17 Although accessibility to the Internet is
broad based, the greatest feature which distinguishes the Internet
from many of the other communication media that have histori-
cally been regulated are the steps required in order to go online.11 8
Receipt of information over the Internet requires a series of affirm-
ative steps much more elaborate than turning a radio dial, or press-
ing the buttons on the television remote control.1 19 In order to
access the Internet, a person requires some sophistication com-
bined with the ability to read and retrieve material in order to be
able to access material.1 20
The types of material that can be accessed over the Internet
are virtually limitless. Information can be published by any person
or organization with a computer connected to the Internet.1 2 1
Among such publishers are government agencies, educational insti-
tutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups and private individu-
als. 122 Given the ease by which material can be published over the
Internet, there exists an abundance of material deemed by various
groups as being unfit for children. 12 3 The CDA is aimed in particu-
lar at sexually explicit material transmitted over the Internet.1 24
Sexually explicit material over the Internet includes text, pictures
and conversations that range from the "modestly titillating to the
hardest core." 12 5 Most of this material however is preceded by
prietary computer networks, they also allow their subscribers to access the much
larger resources of the Internet. See id.
114. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
115. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 833-34.
116. See id. at 832-34.
117. See id. at 832-33.
118. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
119. See id. at 2336.
120. See id.
121. See Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 2336.
124. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223; supra notes 96-97.
125. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
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warnings which let a browser know the type of material they are
about to encounter, before they encounter it. 1 26 It is for this reason
that such material is rarely ever encountered accidentally, but
rather its acquisition requires affirmative steps on the part of the
Internet explorer. 127
Several different techniques have been examined in attempt-
ing to restrict the accessibility of minors to this type of material over
the Internet. These techniques have involved two basic types of
guarding methods, both of which have problems that have made
them impractical in precluding minors from accessing sexually ex-
plicit material. 128 The first type of control involves blocking access
completely to certain cites over the Internet. 29 The second type of
control is not aimed at blocking accessibility in its entirety; rather,
these controls allow access but only after the user has passed
through some type of age verification control. 130
There have been several attempts to limit accessibility to the
Internet through this first method of control. Among these con-
trols are systems which are set to only allow accessibility to an ap-
proved number of sites, systems which block selected inappropriate
sites and systems which are designed to detect certain identifiable
words or characters and then deny access to these sites.'31 Some of
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2336.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2336-37.
131. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. Prodigy, America Online and Microsoft
Network offer parents optional service that will allow the parents to play a role in
the types of sites which are accessible to their children. Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 7 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENr. L. 336 (1997).
These systems are all free of charge. See id. America Online allows a parent to
create a separate account in the name of their child with access on that account
being limited to a content which has been approved by the company. See id. Par-
ents may decide which types of categories they want to have shielded from their
children and that information will be inaccessible from the child's account. See id.
Cyber Patrol and Surfwatch software programs are screening tools which maintain
lists of sites which are known to contain sex-related materials, and attempts to ac-
cess these sites are blocked. See id. The software programs also have the ability to
screen certain trigger words and block any searches that contain these words. See
id. at 336. Surfwatch also gives parents the ability to limit a child's access to only a
certain limited number of sites which have been pre-approved by a parent. See id.
Cyber Patrol is a product by Microsystems Software, Inc., which is an example
of a program which allows a parent to deny their child access to certain categories
of material. See id. The program contains a list of almost 7,000 sites which are
divided into twelve different categories. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 840. A parent
can deny access to a specific category simply by checking off the specific category
in the program manager. The twelve categories include: (1) violence/profanity;
(2) partial nudity; (3) nudity; (4) sexual acts (graphic or text); (5) gross depictions
(graphic or text); (6) racism/ethnic impropriety; (7) satanic/cult; (8) drugs/drug
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the problems with these different control systems are obvious and
make such techniques ineffective in achieving their intended pur-
pose. First, with so many sites being available over the Internet, and
new and expanding sites being established every day, a system
which only allows access to a set number of approved sites would
deny access to thousands of sites that are in no way sexually explicit
or harmful to children. A similar problem results with a system that
blocks out a certain number of selected sites. With new sites pop-
ping up every day, it is not possible to keep track of such sites and
program the blocking device accordingly. 13 2 The third method of
blocking out specific words and characters seems to be the best
suited control, but there are inherent problems with this method as
well. The main problem with this type of control system is that
words and characters can be blocked, but there is no system avail-
able that can block sexually explicit images from being
accessible.1 33
There are two main types of age verification systems that have
been tested to prevent minors from gaining access to the In-
ternet.134 The first of these is credit card verification systems. 135
The problem with credit card verification systems is that non-com-
mercial publishers of Internet material would be hurt by this be-
cause the cost of such a verification system is economically out of
their reach.136 It has also been noted that such a verification system
would serve as a complete bar to adults who do not have a credit
card or lack the resources necessary to obtain one in order to use
the Internet. 137 The next possible verification system is for Internet
culture; (9) militant/extremist; (10) gambling; (11) questionable/illegal; and (12)
alcohol, beer & wine. See id. There are people employed by Microsystems to
search the Internet and add sites to the different categories weekly, as sites are
continually being added to the Internet everyday. See id.
132. See Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'v 363, at 367 (1997) ("Even if parents utilize screening
technology, they cannot thereafter rest assured that the technology will protect
their children. For example, programs which identify specific sites as unsuitable
have difficulty keeping up with the exploding number of new and changing
sites."); Thomas E. Weber, Entertainment & Technology: Child's Play: Keep Out!, Dow
JONES WIRE SERVICE, Mar. 28, 1996.
133. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2336.
134. See id. at 2337.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2337; Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 846. Additional
problems are also noted in the use of a credit card verification system. See Reno I,
929 F. Supp. at 846. Witnesses have stated that neither Visa nor Mastercard is
capable of handling transactions in this manner. See id. While items may be
purchased over the Internet with a credit card, the seller must then process the
transaction in the traditional way over the phone lines. See id. Additionally, when
25
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site providers to issue adult passwords which must be typed into a
site before access is provided to that site. 138 Again this would cause
a severe financial burden on non-commercial sites because of the
cost of issuing these passwords. 139 These passwords would also dis-
courage ordinary users from accessing these sites if they felt their
usage was in some way being monitored. 140
The inadequacy of these methods is part of what led Congress
to enact the CDA in 1996. The Act was directed towards control-
ling the dissemination of "indecent," "obscene" and "patently offen-
sive material" to children on the Internet.141 Congress broke new
ground with this legislation in that no standards had been previ-
ously set with regard to the types of material that could be regu-
lated on the Internet.1 42 Accordingly, the CDA has faced several
questions about the language of the statute, including First Amend-
ment challenges to its validity.1 43
Soon after the enactment of the CDA, suit was filed by numer-
ous plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of § 223(a) (1) and
§ 223(d) of the Act.144 A three judge panel in the Eastern District
such a system does become operational, it will be unavailable to many non-com-
mercial Internet site providers as verification companies would be unwilling to ver-
ify a card unless it involved a commercial transaction. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at
846.
138. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 846-47.
139. See id. at 847.
140. See id, There are numerous other problems associated with using a verifi-
cation system.
On a technical level, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to register
every user of sexually explicit materials. Even if registration could be ac-
complished, there is no way that a provider could ensure that someone
would not register under a false name or age -thus frustrating the very
purpose of the CDA.
Spiliopoulos, supra note 131.
Adult users of the Internet would avoid using these sites because of the regis-
tration requirement. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 847. The Internet has historically
been favored because of the anonymity which it provides to its users. See Spilio-
poulos, supra note 131, at 336. If users were required to register before they could
access a particular site, users would be discouraged from doing so in fear of their
identity being made known. See id.; see also Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 847 (stating that
some noncommercial organizations (ACLU, Critical Path AIDS Project) view
charging viewers as contrary to their goals of getting their message out).
141. See Alan Lewine, supra note 2, at 80.
142. See id.
143. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329; Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 916; Reno 1, 929 F.
Supp. at 824.
144. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. On February 8, 1996, twenty plaintiffs filed
suit against the Attorney General and the Department of Justice challenging the
constitutionality of CDA § 223 (a) (1) and § 223(d). See id. Based on the court's
conclusion that "indecent" was too vague of a standard to provide a basis for a
criminal prosecution, DistrictJudge Buckwalter placed a temporary restraining or-
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of Pennsylvania convened pursuant to the Act and entered a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of both challenged provi-
sions.145 The panel held that the CDA's "indecent transmission"
and "patently offensive display" language violated the freedom of
speech provisions provided in the First Amendment as a result of
their overbreadth and vagueness. 146 The government appealed the
district court's ruling to the Supreme Court arguing that the district
court erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First and
Fifth Amendments. 147 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the case in what has led to one of the most influential decisions by
the Court in recent history. This paper will now examine the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno II and the reasoning that led to
the Court's conclusion.
der on the enforcement of § 223(a) (1) (B) (ii) insofar as it applied to indecent
communications. See id. Subsequently, an action was filed by 27 additional plain-
tiffs, the two cases were joined, and a three judge panel at the district court was
convened pursuant to § 561 of the Act. See id. The three judge court set forth a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of both of the challenged provisions
after an evidentiary hearing was held. See id. at 2339.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs did not challenge the CDA to the extent that
it covered obscenity or child pornography. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829.
These are areas which are not provided any protection under the First Amend-
ment, and were restricted under the law before the CDA came into effect. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (act criminalizing transfer of obscene material); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-52 (criminalizing dissemination of child pornography); Reno , 929 F.
Supp. at 829; see also Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
145. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. The three judges gave a unanimous deci-
sion, but each decided to write his own opinion. See id. ChiefJudge Sloviter stated
that the statute is broader than necessary to achieve the government's purpose and
that such broadness will create a chilling effect among adults. See id. at 2340. She
noted that terms such as "patently offensive" and "indecent" were inherently vague
and that the affirmative defenses provided were not technologically or economi-
cally feasible. See id. at 2340. Judge Buckwalter concluded that these terms were so
vague that criminal enforcement of either provision "would violate the 'fundamen-
tal constitutional principle' of 'simple fairness,' and the specific protections of the
First and Fifth Amendments." See id. Judge Dalzell discussed his feelings of how
the Internet should be entitled to the highest protection from government intru-
sion. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2340. He stated that the Act would abridge signifi-
cant protected speech, particularly by noncommercial speakers, while
"[p]erversely, commercial pornographers would remain relatively unaffected" by
the Act because they would be able to take advantage of several of the defenses
provided by the CDA. Reno , 929 F. Supp. at 879 (emphasis added).
146. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824 (1996). In commenting on how the vague-
ness of the provisions will affect their application, Judge Buckwalter notes "inde-
cency has not been defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value." Id. at 863. Moreover, the government's claim that the work must
be considered patently offensive "in context" was itself vague because the relevant
context might "refer to, among other things, the nature of the communication as a
whole, the time of day it was conveyed, the medium used, the identity of the
speaker, or whether or not it is accompanied by appropriate warnings." Id. at 864.
147. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
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IV. NARRATIvE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens,
affirmed the ruling of the Third Circuit based entirely on violations
of the First Amendment without ever reaching the Fifth Amend-
ment issue.148 The focus of the Court's analysis is centered on the
constitutionality of the indecency provisions of the CDA.149 The
provisions of the Act creating criminal liability for the transmission
of "obscene" material is not at issue here, as it was not challenged
by the plaintiffs in their complaint.1 50 The Supreme Court takes
several different steps in arriving at the conclusion that the inde-
cency provisions of the CDA are unconstitutional. The Court be-
gins by taking a look at some Supreme Court cases dealing with
other media that were raised in defense of the Act by the govern-
ment.151 Second, the Court takes a close look at the distinctions
between different types of media, and accordingly the amount of
First Amendment protection that each type demands. 152 The Court
then takes a look at the statutory language of the CDA in determin-
ing whether the language complies with the First Amendment.153
Finally, the Court looks to sever portions of the Act that are invalid
in hopes of allowing the remainder of the Act to stand.154
A. Cases Dealing with First Amendment Protection of
other Mediums
The first case looked at by the Court was Ginsberg v. New
York. 155 As discussed earlier, Ginsberg involved a situation where the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that pro-
hibited selling to minors, under the age of seventeen, material that
was considered obscene to them, even if such material was not
148. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341. The government made the assertion that
the First Amendment does not prohibit them from imposing a blanket prohibition
on all "indecent" or "patently offensive" material to minors under the age of 18.
See id. at 2342. The Supreme Court did not make a decision on this assertion
because it did not have to in order to decide the controversy before it. See id. The
Court made its decision based on the vague language of the statute and the fact
that the language of the statute was constructed so broadly. See id. Because it was
so broad, it was not the most restrictive means of achieving the government pur-
pose and affected an audience much larger than the one intended. See id. at 2346.
149. See Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
150. See id. at 2339.
151. See infra Part IV.A.
152. See infra notes 170-92 and accompanying text.
153. See infta notes 193-208 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
155. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). For a discussion of Ginsberg, see supra notes 28-35
and accompanying text.
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deemed obscene to adults.1 56 The government relied on this case
in arguing that the CDA was likewise constitutional. 157 The Court
distinguished the statute in Ginsberg from the CDA in that the stat-
ute upheld in Ginsberg was much narrower. 15 8
Four major distinctions were made between the prohibitions in
Ginsberg and those in the CDA. 159 First, in Ginsberg, if a parent
wished, that parent could go out and purchase a magazine for their
child, and the seller of the magazine would be free from criminal
liability.' 60 Under the CDA, criminal liability cannot be escaped
even where a parent has consented to their child viewing the mate-
rial, or where the parent has actually aided in obtaining the mate-
rial for the child.16 1 The second distinction is that the prohibition
in Ginsberg applied only to commercial transactions.' 62 Third, the
CDA provides criminal penalties for the dissemination of "indecent
material," but provides no definition of the term.1 63 With no defi-
nition of what is meant by "indecent material," it is conceivable that
§ 223(d) may include material which has literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. 164 These types of material are all provided pro-
tection under the First Amendment. The Court felt that the statute
discussed in Ginsberg did not include these types of work - instead,
the work prohibited must be "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance for minors.' ' 65 Last, the two statutes presented differing
standards as to what constituted a minor. The Ginsberg statute ap-
plied to minors under the age of seventeen, while the CDA is
broader in its application and applies to minors under the age of
eighteen. 166
The second case relied on by the government was Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. 167 The Court completely dismissed the gov-
ernment's Renton argument, stating that the present prohibition
was a content-based prohibition and therefore the time, place and
156. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
157. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
158. See id.; supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
working of New York statute in Ginsberg); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text
(discussing statutory working of CDA).





164. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
165. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 629, 646 (1968).
166. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
167. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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manner regulation applied in Renton was inapplicable. 168 The
Court stated that the ordinances in Renton were not intended to
limit offensive speech and since the CDA is a content-based blanket
restriction on speech, it cannot be properly analyzed under a time,
place and manner analysis.169
B. Different Amounts of Protection Provided for
Different Mediums
In coming to its conclusion, the Court takes a careful look at
the distinctions between certain types of media, noting that certain
types of media have received limitations upon their First Amend-
ment freedoms.1 70 The Court then proceeds with an analysis of
why those types of media require differing amounts of First Amend-
ment protection than the Internet.17 In distinguishing one me-
dium from the next, the Supreme Court emphasizes two major
factors in justifying a greater level of First Amendment protection
required by the Internet. l7 2 First, the Court notes that the Internet
has never received the type of regulation that has been placed
throughout history on other types of media, such as the broadcast
industry. 173 The second, more convincing factor, is the degree of
invasiveness of each of the different types of media. 174 Communica-
tions over the Internet are not as invasive as other forms of commu-
nication because they do not invade the privacy of one's home or
appear on one's computer uninvited.' 75 Given the affirmative steps
168. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2342. The Court distinguished the ruling in
Renton, which stated that the committee that created the ordinances in Renton did
not aim its regulations at the content of the films themselves, but rather the secon-
dary effects of having such theaters in the community. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 2343-45.
171. See id. "Each medium of expression ... may present its own problems."
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). Thus, some
Supreme Court cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of the
broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers. See Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (relying on historical agency regulation to
justify FCC regulation requiring radio station to provide person attacked in broad-
cast with summary of broadcast and provide attacked person free air time to re-
spond to attack); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (relying on historical
regulation of radio to justify FCC regulation prohibiting broadcast of broadcast
entitled "Filthy Words").
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required in order to access an Internet site, users rarely ever en-
counter a site by accident. 1
76
Among other distinctions, the Court demonstrated the signifi-
cance of the form of medium in distinguishing the regulation of
radio in Pacifica177 from that of the Internet in Reno II. Pacifica held
that the validity of the regulation of a radio program which broad-
casted words which were vulgar and offensive, yet not obscene, was
dependant upon the context of the broadcast. 178 Pacifica involved
radio rather than the Internet, and in justifying special treatment of
indecent broadcasting, the Court placed particular importance on
the ease with which children may hear a radio broadcast. 179 The
difference between the two different types of media proved to be
the most important distinguishing factor between the cases. °80 Ra-
dio is a medium that has historically been given the most limited
First Amendment protection.18' One of the reasons for this is the
susceptibility of radio to the unexpecting listener.182 A listener has
no warning to the type of language they are about to hear until they
have already heard it.183 This is not the case with most other forms
of media. For example, on the Internet, a warning will flash across
the screen where the viewer is about to view explicit materials.18 4 In
this sense, affirmative steps must be taken by a knowing viewer in
order to come across the types of material intended to be prevented
by the CDA.'8 5 This was a leading factor in why the Court deter-
mined that a greater amount of First Amendment protection
should be provided to Internet providers.
A second distinction between the present case and Pacifica is
the nature of the punishment. The CDA provides for a criminal
176. See id. at 2336. The Court states, "[a]lmost all sexually explicit images
are preceded by warnings as to the content," and suggested that the " ' odds are
slim' that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident." Reno II, 117 S. Ct.
at 2336.
177. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
178. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
179. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
180. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
181. See id. at 2341-42.
182. See id. at 2342.
183. See id.
184. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 844. Before coming across an Internet site, a
document's title will usually appear and give the viewer some idea of the content
within the site that is to follow. See id. at 844-45. Many times a user will receive
detailed information about the content of a particular cite before she needs to
take a step to access it. See id. The court also found that most sites with sexually
explicit images contain warnings that precede access, warning viewers as to con-
tent. See id.
185. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
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punishment, where no such punishment was provided with respect
to the radio broadcast regulation in Pacifica.18 6 The last important
distinction between the two cases was that the FCC regulated when,
rather than whether, a radio station could play vulgar language that
deviated significantly from the traditional programming at the sta-
tion. 87 The FCC has regulated radio for decades, whereas no such
organization is familiar with the unique characteristics of the
Internet.188
The Court then distinguished Pacifica further by noting the dis-
tinctions that were made of the case in Sable.189 Sable involved an
amendment to the Communications Act that proposed a blanket
prohibition on commercial telephone messages that were either ob-
scene or indecent.190 Similar to the situation in Reno II, the govern-
ment in Sable relied on Pacifica in arguing that the statute was
constitutional. 191 The Court acknowledged a compelling interest
to prevent children from hearing these types of telephone
messages, but distinguished Sable from Pacifica because it did not
involve a complete ban and related to a different medium of
communication. 19 2
C. The Statutory Wording of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996
The language of the CDA becomes ambiguous because of the
use of different terminology in different parts of the Act without
any definition or embellishment as to what the terms mean. 193 The
186. See id. at 2342. The Court refused to determine whether the indecent
broadcast which was the issue of Pacifica would justify a criminal prosecution. See
id.
187. See id.
188. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 n.33. Borrowing language from Pacifica, the
Court stated:
When Pacifica was decided, given that radio stations were allowed to oper-
ate only pursuant to federal license, and that Congress had enacted legis-
lation prohibiting licensees from broadcasting indecent speech, there was
a risk that members of the radio audience might infer some sort of offi-
cial or societal approval of whatever was heard over the radio. No such
risk attends messages received through the Internet, which is not super-
vised by any federal agency.
Id.
189. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
190. See id. at 126.
191. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. The government argued that the ban on
indecent or obscene messages was constitutional because it was necessary to pre-
vent children from gaining access to such messages. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
192. See id.
193. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
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first part of the CDA refers to material that is "indecent,"194 and
the second part of the statute refers to material that "in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by con-
temporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs."1 95 The Court notes that because Congress failed to define
either term, the difference in language will create confusion as to
the meaning of each standard and how, if at all, they relate to each
other.1 96 In demonstrating the ambiguity of the language, the
Court poses the hypothetical question of whether serious discus-
sions of contemporary issues such as prison rape, birth control or
homosexuality would violate the CDA.197
The vague language of the CDA creates an abundance of First
Amendment issues as to its application. The most important poten-
tial problem of such vague language is the potential chilling effect
that the statute may create.1 98 The CDA is a criminal statute, and
accordingly it is noted that the severity of a criminal conviction may
cause speakers to refrain from speech or communication that is
even questionably included under the language of the statute. 199
The government argued that the statute was no more vague than
the standard that was held constitutional in Miller v. California2°°
194. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
195. Id. § 223(d).
196. See Reno II, at 2344 n.35 ("'Indecent' does not benefit from any textual
embellishment at all. 'Patently offensive' is qualified only to the extent that it in-
volves 'sexual or excretory activities or organs' taken 'in context' and 'measured by
contemporary community standards.'"). Cf Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498
U.S. 395, 404 (1991) ("Where Congress includes particular language in one sec-
tion of a statute but omits it from another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
and exclusion.").
197. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 2344-45. Violations of the CDA subject a person to a criminal
sanction of imprisonment for no more than two years, or fines under Title 18, or
both. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d). The Court states that the increased deterrent ef-
fect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague restrictions,
poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil regula-
tion reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996). See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
Denver Area involved a challenge to the 1992 Cable Act which regulated "inde-
cent" speech over the access channels of cable television. See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct.
at 2378. The Court struck down part of the blocking provision citing the chilling
effect that the Act would impose upon adult speech. For a discussion of Denver
Area, see supra note 33.
200. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). The government presented the argument that
because the language of the CDA restricted material that was "patently offensive,"
which happens to be one part of the Miller test, the CDA cannot be unconstitution-
ally vague. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
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under the three-prong test developed by the Court. Looking at the
three-prong test pronounced in Miller, the Court stated that the
vague language of the CDA leads to a silencing of speech that is
much broader than that required by the Miller test.20 1
After analyzing the language of the CDA, the Court concluded
that its language does not satisfy the requirements of the Miller
test.20 2 While the statute does restrict material that is "patently of-
fensive," this is only the first portion of the second prong of the
test.20 3 Absent from the CDA is a requirement that the patently
offensive material must be "specifically defined by applicable state
law." 20 4 The language of the CDA is also much broader than that of
the Miller test.20 5 The Court states that the Miller test is limited to
"sexual conduct," while the language of the CDA extends beyond
this and includes materials that include "sexual or excretory activi-
ties or organs."20 6 The CDA also fails to comply with the third
prong of the Miller test as it does not limit the extent of the regula-
tion to works that lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.20 7 The government's contention that a court will be able to
give such restrictions to the CDA's standards is rejected by the
Court based on the belief that such questions are to be regarded as
questions of fact.20 8
D. Could the Same End Be Achieved Through Less
Restrictive Means?
While the government may have a compelling interest for re-
stricting various types of speech, such restrictions will be invalid if
there is a less restrictive alternative that would produce at least an
equivalent effect as the statute in question.20 9 In enacting the CDA,
the government intended to protect children from harmful materi-
als. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in protecting children from such
201. SeeRenoI, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. For a discussion of the Millertest, see supra
notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
202. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.




207. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. The Court stated that this "societal value"
standard allows courts to impose some limitations and regularity by setting a na-
tional floor in determining what types of material have a socially redeeming value.
See id.
208. See id.
209. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
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materials. 210 While the Court has continually recognized this inter-
est in regulating the type of communication received by children,
Congress cannot word the statute so broadly as to also affect adults
where a less restrictive alternative would have accomplished the
same purpose.211 In order to understand the Court's reasoning
here, it is important to examine the goals of the legislature as well
as whether the statute was drafted to embody the least restrictive of
the government's alternatives in reaching their goal.2 12
The Supreme Court concluded that the CDA was overly broad
in its impact as the affected audience of the legislation will extend
far beyond the minors whom the statute is intended to protect. 213
The effect of this overbreadth could be enormous considering the
available audience for a publisher who places a site on the In-
ternet.214 Given the size of the potential audience, combined with
the unavailability of an effective age verification device, it is incon-
ceivable that an Internet provider could be charged with not know-
ing that at least one minor might be in the audience, thus leading
to criminal sanctions under the CDA.2 15 This being the case, many
210. See id.; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
211. See Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2393 (Government cannot "reduc[e] the
adult population... to ... only what is fit for children" (quoting Sable Communi-
cations of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("The level of discourse reaching a mailbox
simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for sandbox.").
212. See Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are?
Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15J. MARSHALL J. OF COM-
PUTER & INFO. L. 51, 94 (1996) (asserting that heavy-handed content-based legisla-
tion creates chilling effect on speech as such legislation denies adult access to
constitutionally protected speech; and noting that legislation controlling content
of computer speech through unlimited criminal liability is not least restrictive
means that Congress may employ).
213. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2346-47.
214. See id. at 2349.
215. See id. at 2347. The district court made several findings as to the ineffec-
tiveness of other available tagging techniques at the trial that would serve as effec-
tive means to determine the age of the Internet user. See Reno , 929 F. Supp. at
845. The court also found that it would be extremely uneconomical for non-com-
mercial Internet providers to use any type of age verification system. See id at 845-
48. But the district court found that "[d] espite its limitations, currently available
user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents
can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material
which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely
available." See id. at 842. As Justice O'Connor writes in her opinion:
Until gateway technology is available through cyberspace, and it is not in
1997, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that the speech he displays
will reach only adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an
"adult zone." Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the
CDA is to refrain completely from using the indecent speech. But this
forced silence impinges on the First Amendment right of adults to make
35
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Internet providers would simply refrain from sending messages
which they felt were punishable by criminal sanctions under the
CDA.216 This would clearly burden adults, as much of the informa-
tion that would be withdrawn would not be inappropriate informa-
tion for people over the age of eighteen.2 1 7 The Court also
distinguished the restriction in the present case from similar restric-
tions looked at in Ginsberg and Pacifica on grounds that the CDA
affected not only commercial entities, but expanded to anyone who
might post indecent messages. 218
The effect of this legislation was deemed by the Court as not
only broad in the audience affected, but overly broad as to the types
of material restricted as well.219 The terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" could apply beyond Congress's initial intention and also
restrict "large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious
educational or other value." 220 The Court also feared that the com-
munity standard by which material will be judged could be the stan-
dard of the community most likely to be offended by the
material. 221
In its analysis, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test and
found that the overbreadth of the statute was not enough, in itself,
to invalidate the Act.22 2 Congress may draft a statute that is overly
broad, if such a statute is necessary in order to achieve the govern-
and obtain this speech and, for all intents and purposes, reduce[s] the
adult population [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for
children.
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (citations omitted).
216. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
217. See Reno II, S. Ct. at 2347. "Knowledge that, for instance, one or more
members of a 100-person chat group will be minor - and therefore that it would
be a crime to send the group an indecent message - would surely burden com-
munication among adults." Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. The Court also points out that the legislation could extend to
educational material which was created to deal with issues such as prison rape or
safe sex. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2347. The restriction could also apply to nude
art, and, quite possibly, the card catalog of the Carnegie Library. See id.
221. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.
222. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
strict scrutiny analysis and the different types of tests which the court may apply.
In this instance, the Court refuses to apply the rational basis test. See Reno II,
117 S. Ct. at 2346-47. The Court cites Sable in rejecting the argument that they
should defer to congressional judgment that nothing less than the CDA would be
effective in establishing their goal. See id. at 2346. "Sable thus made clear that the
mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted for the important pur-
pose of protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material does not
foreclose inquiry into its validity." Id.
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ment's purpose.223 As the Court states, however, the "burden on
adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be
at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the stat-
ute was enacted to serve."22 4 The Supreme Court thus has a duty to
make sure that Congress has designed the statute to "accomplish its
purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech."' 22 5 The government, however, failed to meet its burden of
showing that less restrictive means were not available. 2 26  The
Court therefore concluded that the CDA was too narrowly tailored
and therefore unconstitutional. 22 7
E. Severability of the CDA
The last and final plea by the government in defense of the
CDA was that the Court apply the severability clause contained in
47 U.S.C.A. § 608228 to save portions of the Act.2 29 This is an impor-
tant aspect of the opinion because it is the only area where Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion diverges from the majority.
1. Justice Stevens' (Majority Opinion) Use of Severability Clause
The severability clause of the CDA requires the Court to sever
any textual provisions of an act that can be severed and leave the
rest standing. 230 The Court found that there was only one provi-
sion of § 223 (a) which could be severed and have the remainder of
the statute stand on its own.2 3 1 The phrase "or indecent" was sev-
223. See id. at 2346.
224. Id. An especially heavy burden is placed on the government, under the
strict scrutiny test, to show that a less restrictive provision would not achieve the
same goals as the CDA. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2348. Several possible alternatives
to the CDA were presented in court, such as requiring indecent material be tagged
to aid in parental control of the material which a minor may receive, making ex-
ceptions for material with artistic or educational value, providing more tolerance
for parental approval, and regulating some areas of the Internet more than others.
See id. Because Congress made no detailed findings as to any of these methods, the
government failed to meet the burden placed upon them, and the Court decided
that the CDA was therefore not narrowly tailored. See id. at 2348.
225. See id. at 2347 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v.
FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996)).
226. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2348-50.
227. See id. at 2348.
228. 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (Supp. 1997). The statutory language reads "[i]f any
provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
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ered from § 223(a) and the rest of the provision was left stand-
ing.232 The rest of § 223(a) deals with the transmission of obscene
material, and since this material is provided no constitutional pro-
tection under the First Amendment, it could be left standing. The
government also made a plea to uphold the statute to "persons or
circumstances" where the CDA could be applied constitution-
ally.23 3 The Court completely rejected this request, stating that
such an application could not be made when challenging a provi-
sion on its face and that even if such an application could be made,
the CDA was not readily susceptible to such a severing.234
2. Justice O'Connor's (Concurring in Part/Dissenting in Part) Use of
the Severability Clause
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote an
opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part, differing
with the majority on the extent to which the CDA should be severed
and left standing.235 O'Connor writes that there are two basic re-
quirements that need to be met for an Internet zoning law to with-
stand a First Amendment challenge.2 3 6 The law must not unduly
232. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (Supp. 1997).
233. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
234. See id. The government made a plea relying on 47 U.S.C. § 608 which
states that a statute that is facially unconstitutional may be upheld to those persons
and circumstances to which the act is constitutional. See id. Relying on Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the government argued that the Court
had the power to declare the statute "invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but
otherwise left intact." Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350 (citing Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503-
04). The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. See id. First, the Court
argued that the authority behind this expedited review is 47 U.S.C.A. § 561 and as
such the statute only allows challenges to the CDA on its face. See id. Accordingly,
the case to that point had been treated by all parties as a facial challenge. See id.
The Court therefore stated that it had no authority to make a ruling on an "as-
applied" challenge. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350. Second, Brockett stated that
when considering a facial challenge, the Court may apply the type of limiting con-
struction which is requested by the government, but only where the statute is
"readily susceptible" to this type of construction. See id. The Court then stated that
as such the CDA lends no guidance to limiting its coverage and therefore is not
"readily susceptible" to such a limiting construction. See id. The Court stated that
where a statute provides such overly broad language and gives no indication where
the line should be drawn, the court should decline to attempt to draw such a line
because they risk violating the separation of powers. See id; United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("[I]t would certainly be dangerous if the Legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could rightfully be detained, and who should be
set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government.").
235. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part/dissenting in part).
236. See id. at 2352-53.
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restrict adult access to the Internet, and minors must lack a First
Amendment right to obtain the material which is being restricted
from them. 237 In her departure from the majority opinion, she dis-
cusses both of these requirements.
In order to understand both the reasoning and conclusion of
this opinion, it is important to understand how Justice O'Connor
interprets the "patently offensive" provision. She writes that this
provision should actually be broken down into two smaller provi-
sions; the "specific person" provision and the "display" provision.238
The "specific person" provision refers to the portion of
§ 223(d) (1) (a) which makes it a crime to knowingly send a patently
offensive message or image to a "specific person" under the age of
eighteen. 239 The "display" provision refers to the portion of
§ 223(d) (1) (b) which makes the display of patently offensive
messages or images available to minors a criminal offense. 240
InJustice O'Connor's opinion, she writes that the CDA fails in
its entirety only in respect to the "display" provision.241 The CDA
fails only in some instances with respect to the "indecency transmis-
sion" and "specific person" provisions by unduly restricting adult
access to protected material.2 42 Justice O'Connor would sever the
CDA in these circumstances only and leave the Act standing in all
other respects. 243
(a.) Does It Unduly Restrict Adult Access to the Material?
According to Justice O'Connor, the "display" provision is the
only aspect of the CDA that is invalidated in its entirety.2 4 4 She
states that the "indecency transmission" and "specific persons" pro-
visions are not unconstitutional in all instances. 245 Her opinion
suggests that both of these provisions are constitutional when ap-
237. See id. at 2353.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2352.
241. See id. at 2354.
242. See id. Justice O'Connor establishes some criteria in her opinion for de-
termining when Internet zoning regulations similar to those in the CDA would be
able to withstand a constitutional challenge. See id, In order for such a zoning
system to be effective "(i) an agreed upon code (or "tag") would have to exist; (ii)
screening software or browsers with screening capabilities would have to be able to
recognize the "tag"; and (iii) those programs would have to be widely available-
and widely used-by Internet users." Id. She also notes that none of these criteria
was met at the time of the Reno H/ decision. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2354.
243. See id. at 2351.
244. See id. at 2354.
245. See Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2355.
467
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plied to a conversation involving one adult and one or more mi-
nors.246 But if a minor were to enter communications between all
adults, the CDA requires these adults to refrain from using inde-
cent language or face the risk of criminal prosecution. 247 It is in
this second situation where both the "specific person" and "in-
deceny transmission" provisions come into conflict with the First
Amendment. 248 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor believes that the
CDA should be applied in situations where its provisions are consti-
tutional and invalidated in all other scenarios. 2 49 O'Connor thus
concludes "I would therefore sustain the 'indecency transmission'
and 'specific person' provisions to the extent they apply to the
transmission of Internet communications where the party initiating
the communication knows that all of the recipients are minors."250
(b.) Do Minors Have a Right to Read or View the Banned
Material?
Justice O'Connor was forced to deal with a crucial issue in her
opinion that was never reached by Justice Stevens in the majority
opinion. This question involves whether the CDA substantially in-
terferes with the First Amendment rights of minors.2 51 She con-
cludes in her opinion that the CDA does not violate the
Constitution in this respect, relying heavily on the decision in
Ginsberg.25 2
The opinion points out that the CDA denies minors under the
age of eighteen the ability to obtain material which has some re-
246. See id. at 2354-55. Justice O'Connor makes an analogy between the CDA
and the statute of Ginsberg in this situation. See id. at 2355. She states that restrict-
ing what one adult may say when they are in the company of minors and no other
adults in no way restricts that adult's ability to communicate with other adults. See
id.
247. See id.
248. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2355.
249. See id.; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985)
("Where the parties challenging the statute are those who desire to engage in pro-
tected speech that the overbroad statute purports to punish... [t]he statute may
forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left
intact.").
250. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2356.
251. See id.
252. See id. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court held that minors could be re-
stricted from receiving materials that were deemed obscene to minors. 390 U.S.
629, 631 (1968). Ginsberg set out a three prong test for determining what consti-
tutes material that is obscene to minors. See id. at 635. Material will be considered
obscene to minors if it: (i) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; (ii) is pa-
tently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable for minors; and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
value to minors. See id. at 633.
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deeming value even if the material does not appeal to their pruri-
ent interest.253 O'Connor acknowledges this possibility, but holds
that this is not enough to prevail in a facial challenge of the consti-
tutionality of a congressional act.25 4 In order for an act to be invali-
dated by a facial challenge, the overbreadth must be "real" or
"substantial. '25 5 In the opinion of Justice O'Connor, the loss of ma-
terial to minors which is of redeeming social value is of such a mi-
nor significance that the CDA does not "burden a substantial
amount of minors' constitutionally protected speech."256 Thus, Jus-
tice O'Connor would only invalidate the "display" provision of the
Act in its entirety, and the "indecency transmission" and "specific
person" provisions to the extent that they prohibit the use of inde-
cent speech between two or more adults.
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Reno II, the Court dealt with the validity of an attempt by
Congress to regulate the types of material that may be dispersed
over the Internet. In doing so, the Court established some stan-
dards for the future regulation of the medium that appear to be
consistent with past decisions involving application of the First
Amendment to other types of media. This section will analyze some
of the principles set forth by the Court, as well as address some of
the early criticism the decision has received since it was handed
down by the Court.
A. Regulation of a New Medium
Throughout the last 100 years, different media of communica-
tion have emerged and become standardized throughout society.
Starting with radio, telephone, then came television, cable televi-
sion and in the past twenty years has come interaction over com-
puter networks. These forms of communication have undoubtedly
helped our country progress in countless ways, but these media
253. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2356.
254. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
255. See id.
256. See Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2356. Justice O'Connor notes that although
discussions about prison rape or nude art may have some redeeming educational
value to adults, they do not necessarily pose the same value for minors. See id. She
also states that the standard presented in Ginsberg required that the material be of
redeeming social importance for minors. See id. The opinion also accuses the Ap-
pellees of presenting no examples of any speech falling under this category which
is substantial in any way to the statute's legitimate sweep. See id.
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have not been without their problems. 257 As discussed throughout
this Note, one of the largest problems associated with these media
is their ability to transmit material that is unfit or unsuited for mi-
nors. 258 One of the major problems in attempting to regulate a
medium for the first time is being able to do so in a manner that
does not trample upon the First Amendment rights that users of
that medium may be provided under the Constitution.2 59
In attempting to determine the amount of protection that a
particular medium may be afforded, the most important factors to
look at are the intrusiveness and pervasiveness of that medium.2 60
The Internet is relatively unintrusive when considered in light of
other media whose content has historically been regulated.2 61 In
order to access a particular site on the Internet, one must take af-
257. See supra Section IV for a discussion of the types of material that may be
maintained over the Internet that have led to problems concerning the accessibil-
ity of this material to minors.
258. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of In-
ternet accessibility.
259. See Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 7
DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. 336 (1997).
The Supreme Court has recognized that each medium of expression is
capable of presenting unique problems for First Amendment jurispru-
dence. Unlike other media, where the written or spoken word is clearly
broadcast from a defined source, the distinction between speaker and
listener is unclear for Internet communications. The entrance barriers
for listeners and speakers are virtually identical. The users and providers
are active participants in speech. They are not merely passive listeners
taking part in public discourse. Because of the problems of defining
speaker and listener on the Internet, the traditional notions of constitu-
tionally-protected "speech" must be re-worked to encompass this inter-
active medium. The legal standards that govern the Internet must also
change to reflect that progress. Specifically, the special qualities of this
global forum demand the broadest protection afforded by the courts.
Id.; see alsoJose I. Rojas, The Internet and Content Control: Liability of Creators, Distribu-
tors and End-Users, 471 PLI/PAT 203, at 207 (1997). The new frontier of the In-
ternet presents several challenges to practitioners to develop new rules. See id.
These practitioners must match the unique needs of the Internet with established
concepts of constitutional law. See id.
260. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28
(1989) (holding that telephone is not as intrusive as radio in Pacifica; because af-
firmative steps need to be taken, telephone does not surprise unexpecting lis-
tener); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2 (noting that major factor was that radios are in
homes and places where privacy interests are afforded extra deference); Erznoznik
v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (holding that interest of speaker may have
greater weight outside privacy of audience's home). Commentators have also
noted that the Pacifica decision was based on the Court's analysis of intrusiveness
and persuasiveness. See Lewine, supra note 2, at 121-22.
261. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
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firmative steps. 262 A person must type in particular search phrases,
then they must point and click on particular links in order to arrive
at their desired location.263 These affirmative steps decrease the
possibility of accidentally coming across some offensive material. 264
Unlike other media such as television or radio, where a person may
come across offensive material unexpectedly, the Internet requires
a person to take affirmative steps to obtain that information. 265 In-
ternet sites containing indecent or patently offensive material are
invited by a viewer into the home, and are, therefore, much less
intrusive than identical material that may be unexpectedly viewed
or heard over other media.266 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
seems justified in providing a lesser amount of First Amendment
protection to the Internet than has historically been given to other
types of media.
B. Overbreadth of the CDA
As noted in the majority opinion, the language of the CDA was
held to be overly broad in its application. 267 The provisions of the
Act extended not only to obscene materials, but to materials which
were neither obscene nor pornographic, and as such, these materi-
als are protected under the First Amendment. 268 Many critics of
the Supreme Court's decision have argued that the "indecency"
provision is not overly broad because certain materials that may not
be obscene may still be harmful when viewed by children. 269
Commentators have emphasized that, while sexual or excretory
speech may have value for adults, this does not necessarily mean
that it provides any value to a less mature audience, and therefore
262. See id.; Johnson, supra note 212, at 94 ("Hence, unlike the television,
radio, or telephone message service, the Internet is not an uninvited guest. In-
stead, the virtual world must be invited in.").
263. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See William Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, 482
PLI/PAT 33, at 42-43. The Internet possesses characteristics that make it difficult
to justify any regulation of its content by the government. See id. Regulation is
made difficult because the Internet is inexpensive, interactive, user-controlled,
contains low barriers to entry, contains speech which is not concerned with ratings
or bringing in money, and is democratic in nature. See id.
267. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
Court found the language of the CDA to be overly broad.
268. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a).
269. See Liz Willen, This Isn't Kid Stuff N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1994, at A6; see
also Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POI'Y 363, 373 (1997) (suggesting that educational information on
topics such as safe sex, AIDS and prison rape can actually be harmful to minors).
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the government has a lesser interest in protecting minors from this
material. 270 An advocate of the CDA cited an informational AIDS
brochure which was distributed by the Gay Men's Health Crisis in
New York City to a high school conference sponsored by the New
York City Board of Education as an example of the type of material
which was not obscene, was fit for adults, yet completely inappropri-
ate for minors.271
In making this argument, critics of the Supreme Court deci-
sion overlook the rationale behind the Court's determination that
the CDA was too broad.272 While much of the material provided
over the Internet that provides educational value to adults may be
harmful to minors, if a less restrictive means of restriction is avail-
able, Congress cannot restrict this material at the expense of mate-
rial which is truly educational to minors.273
To understand some of the educational information on the In-
ternet that provides value to minors, one need go no further than
consider some of the plaintiffs which were represented by the
ACLU in this suit.274 For example, one of the plaintiffs is Planned
Parenthood who place speech involving safe sex on their web
sites. 275 The Critical Path AIDS Web page is another site which in-
structs visitors about safe sex practices, but uses street terminology,
fearing that the use of the Latinate terms will lead teenagers to mis-
270. See Peters, supra note 269, at 373-74.
271. See Liz Willen, This Isn't Kid Stuff N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1994, at A6. In
1994, distribution of "safe sex" brochure which was prepared by adults was distrib-
uted at a high school conference, co-sponsored by the New York City Board of
Education. See id. The Chancellor of New York Schools later commented on the
brochure, stating that it "dealt with sexual practices, contained language that was
totally inappropriate and possessed no educational value." Id.
272. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1152 (1996).
In simple terms, the prohibition of "indecent" material restricts significantiy more
material than just what may be harmful to minors. See id. The effects of the CDA
extend beyond material which has prurient appeal. See id. The CDA could lead to
prohibition of works ranging from Michelangelo's David, to The Catcher in the Rye,
to Huckleberry Finn. See id. Writers have noted that the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that the works of James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, James Baldwin and Frank
Harris may be classified as "indecent" in some communities. See id.
273. SeeJohnson, supra note 212, at 62 (discussing that First Amendment pro-
tects material which is crude or vulgar, provided material is not obscene, as such
work may have some artistic value; such crude or vulgar material may, however, be
restricted when it poses danger to children).
274. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 825-26.
275. See Symposium, Panel II: Indecency on the Internet: Constitutionality of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & EN r. L.J. 463,
507 (1997).
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understand what is being taught.276 It is naive to pretend that this
information is not educational, as well as extremely important to
the country's teenage population.
C. Screening Systems Are Ineffective in Lessening the Effects of
the CDA on Protected Speech
Many supporters of the CDA argue that, due to several screen-
ing techniques, the CDA does not have a negative effect on consti-
tutionally protected speech. Case support for this assertion comes
from Renton.277 Renton dispels the Court's emphasis on the eco-
nomic unfeasibility of credit card and adult password gateway sys-
tems.2 78 This would eliminate one of the leading factors that the
Court relied on in dismissing the effectiveness of such systems in
Reno 11.279 The use of these devices would provide an affirmative
defense under the CDA and perhaps save the statute from
invalidation.28 0
This argument is moot however, because even if the economic
feasibility of these systems becomes irrelevant in determining their
practicality, there are still inherent problems with the operations of
these devices that make them ineffective solutions to the CDA's
276. See id. at 507-08. In discussing the CDA, Chris Hansen, an ACLU lawyer,
states that any discussion of homosexuality could be regarded as "patently offen-
sive," given the lack of definition provided by the statute. He states further:
At a time when states and school boards are passing laws trying to take
rights away from gay people and the Clinton Administration is trying to
prevent gay people in the military from even saying out loud, "I'm gay,"
to suggest that no one is going to find speech about being gay patently
offensive seems to me hopelessly naive. I certainly do not feel comfort,
and nor should anyone, at the thought that I might have to go to prison
for engaging in that kind of speech.
Id. at 508; see also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 272, at 1152 (explaining how
CDA threatens valuable medical, scientific, political topics, such as the "Virtual
Hospital" site established by University of Iowa).
277. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
That respondents must fend for themselves.., on an equal footing with
other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First
Amendment violation. . . . [W]e have never suggested that the First
Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or
any other kind of speech related businesses for that matter, will be able to
obtain sites at bargain prices.
See id.
278. See id.
279. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2347 (noting that it would be prohibitively ex-
pensive for both commercial and noncommercial web site providers to verify users
were adults).
280. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e) (5) (B) (indicating that Internet site provider can
avoid liability where it has restricted access through use of "verified credit card,
debit account, adult access code, or personal identification number.").
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overbreadth. As discussed previously, these gateway screening con-
cepts are unable to keep children from accessing inappropriate ma-
terial which may be accessed over the Internet.28' Screening
systems have the ability to detect trigger words and phrases, but do
not possess the capability of detecting sexually explicit images that
may be contained in particular sites.28 2
Even if credit card or password verification systems became ec-
onomically feasible, there are still many inherent problems with
these two devices which make them impractical. First, credit card
verification systems for the Internet are not yet technically possi-
ble.28 3 While many credit card transactions take place over the In-
ternet, the seller must then process the transaction with the
creditor off-line using telephone lines.28 4 An adult verification by
password system would most likely fail as well, as many experts sug-
gest that casual Internet users would be discouraged from visiting
certain sites if required to sign on with a password.28 5 Aside from
the feasibility of either of these methods, the government failed to
provide any evidence as to their effectiveness at trial and thus failed
to meet their burden of evidence. 28 6
C. International Nature of the Internet
The above findings are heavily supported, but even if there
were effective devices to prevent constitutionally protected speech
between adults from being chilled, the statute is not an effective
means to achieve Congress's intended goal.28 7 This is due to the
281. See supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inadequacies of different monitoring devices available for the Internet; see also San-
ford & Lorenger, supra note 272, at 1153 (discussing that verification systems based
on dial-a-porn services are not feasible for Internet and that most producers in
cyberspace have no control over accessibility to their messages.
282. See Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
283. See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 847.
286. See id.
287. But see Peters, supra note 269, at 378.
Law enforcement agencies are also having difficulty enforcing other laws,
including those pertaining to copyright, theft, fraud, libel, harassment,
gambling, child abuse, invasions of privacy, and terrorism. That "Internet
outlaws" may now be winning is not a reason to repeal these laws or to
declare them unconstitutional. The international dimension of the dial-
a-porn industry has also created problems enforcing 47 U.S.C. 223(b),
but to my knowledge, no one has argued that Section 223(b) is, there-
fore, unconstitutional.
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international nature of the Internet.288 Much of the material that is
either pornographic or inappropriate for minors is- material that is
accessed from international servers and thus exempt from the laws
of the United States. 289 The CDA only restricts the actions of In-
ternet providers in the United States, while it has been noted that
as much as thirty percent of the sexually explicit material available
over the Internet originates outside of the country.290 Thus, the
CDA will not even resolve a significant portion of the problem to
which it is directed. Thus, it seems highly doubtful that the CDA
would be able to pass the government's strict scrutiny test.29 1 The
burden of the CDA on constitutionally protected adult speech
would far outweigh the minimal benefit the statute would create in
preventing indecent materials from being accessible to minors. 292
D. Case Law Does Not Permit O'Connor's Severance
Justice O'Connor asserts that the Court should keep the CDA
in place to the extent that it would not be unconstitutional. 293 Un-
fortunately, the Court is not provided the luxury of severing the
statute in order to satisfy this requirement. The majority opinion
cites Brockett in limiting a court's ability to sever a statute in an "as
288. See Jose I. Rojas, supra note 259, at 206-07. The Internet is truly "world-
wide." See id. at 206. What may be offensive to communities within the United
States may not necessarily be offensive to communities in Germany or other for-
eign nations. See id. Some even claim that government should not get involved in
the regulation of the Internet, but rather, allow the vastly thriving community to
develop its own rules. See id.
289. Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 7 DEPAUL-
LCAJ. ART & ENw. L. 336 (1997).
The CDA is unconstitutionally overbroad as construed because it bans
constitutionally-protected speech. It is important to note that only 12-
15% of the total population of the United States is on-line. Just as there is
only a small percentage of the population on the Internet, only a small
percentage of the material found in cyberspace is pornographic. Further-
more, almost half of all pornographic material found on-line comes from
outside the United States - and outside of the reach of prosecution by
U.S. officials.
See id.
290. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
291. See id.
292. See id. "[T]he state may not regulate at all if it turns out that even the
least restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on
freedom of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those limita-
tions." See id. (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d
Cir. 1988).
293. See Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2355.
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applied" fashion where the statute's constitutionality is being chal-
lenged, as it was here, on its face. 294
If the Court were to apply the CDA, as O'Connor suggested, on
a case-by-case basis to the extent that it is constitutional, the Court
would risk what the three judge panel in Shea referred to as 'Judi-
cial legislation."295 This is precisely what Justice O'Connor recom-
mended that the Court do in breaking up the CDA into several
different provisions. 296 The Court should leave it to Congress to
enact legislation that will not violate constitutionally protected First
Amendment rights and not play the role of the legislature itself.
Despite these varying opinions presented by different groups,
the majority has a strong argument that is amply supported by rele-
vant case law. Under the decision in Reno H, obscene material re-
mains restricted, which is the heart of the government's compelling
interest. The only thing lost by the case's ruling is the restriction of
"patently offensive" and "indecent" material, to which there was no
clear definition as to what was originally included under these
terms.
V. IMPACT
Reno H will undoubtedly serve as a landmark case regarding
First Amendment rights over the Internet. The effects of the deci-
sion are likely to go in several different directions as lawmakers at-
tempt to restructure state and federal laws to accommodate this
294. See id. at 2350. The legislature can abridge expression in two different
ways. The first of these ways is a content-based restriction on speech. See Lewine,
supra note 2, at 108-09. These ways "aim at limiting communicative impact by sin-
gling out a message for government sanction or control because of the content of
the message or the anticipated effects of the message." Id. The second method by
which Congress can restrict expression is referred to as a non-content-based re-
striction. See id. at 109-10. These methods restrict "the flow of information or
ideas by aiming at the non-communicative aspects of expression while pursuing
other goals." Id. Examples of this non-content-based type of restriction include
time, place and manner restrictions. See id. at 110. "The Supreme Court applies
strict scrutiny to content-based regulations because 'at the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.'" See
Alan Lewine, supra note 2, 118 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2458 (1994)).
295. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's fear of applying congressional statutes in ways that may be con-
strued as 'Judicial legislation."
296. See supra Part IV.E.2.
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decision, while companies and Internet site providers feel a contin-
ual stress to create family-friendly access. 297
Industry observers have stated that a newly revamped CDA is
highly unlikely, noting that the majority opinion in Reno IIis strong
enough to rule out any such attempts.298 Despite this assertion,
many legislators have vowed to return with a new revision of the
CDA.299 Along other lines, a few legislators in Congress have intro-
duced legislation aimed at areas that were formerly covered under
provisions of the CDA. Representative Zoe Lofgren, a Democrat
from California, introduced the "Internet Freedom of Protection
Act" (H.R. 774) which requires Internet Service providers to pro-
vide screening software to subscribers. 300 Along similar lines, the
"Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997" (H.R. 1180) was intro-
duced on March 20, 1997 by congressman Joseph McDade, a Re-
297. See Peters, supra note 269, at 365 ("In order to head off regulation, the
communications industry has embarked on a public relations campaign to pro-
mote parental use of screening technology to shield children from pornography
on the Internet.").
It is noteworthy that distribution of some of the most harmful material over
the Internet is punishable under already existing statutes. SeeJohnson, supra note
212, at 79. As noted previously "obscene" material is provided no protection
under the First Amendment, accordingly federal and state governments have en-
acted statutes that prohibit the distribution of obscene material over various forms
of media. See id. This prohibition has been applied to obscene speech that was
transmitted through a computer network. See id. at 80-81. In United States v.
Thomas, computer bulletin board operators were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1465
(1994) for transmitting sexually obscene pictures through interstate phone lines.
See 74 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
convicted the Thomases on the grounds that a federal statute applied to these
types of on-line services. See id. at 706. The court held that Congress clearly in-
tended "to stem the transportation of obscene material in interstate commerce
regardless of the means used to effect that end." See id. at 709 (citations omitted).
The Thomases were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1465, which reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly transports in ... interstate or foreign commerce for
the purpose of sale or distribution . . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy book, pamphlet, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, draw-
ing, figure, image, cast, pornographic recording, electrical transcription
... or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned ....
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
298. TELECOMMUNICATION REP. (MondayJune 29, 1997).
299. Commentators have stated that while Congress may make attempts to
draft a replacement for the CDA that is more narrowly construed in an attempt to
satisfy the Court, "it is difficult to see how Congress can define indecency in a way
that survives this decision." SeeJames C. Goodale, Big Surprises in the Internet Ruling,
218 N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1997, at 1. Goodale states that Congress will have to be inge-
nious to come up with a definition of indecency that is different than obscenity,
thus the concept of indecency as detached from the concept of obscenity may be
over. See id.
300. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Reno v. ACLU: The First Amendment
Meets the Internet, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1997, at 3.
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publican from Pennsylvania. 30 1 This Act would require Internet
access providers to supply screening software that would permit par-
ents to limit their child's access to "unsuitable" material on the In-
ternet.30 2  Finally, Senator Patty Murray, a Democrat from
Washington, plans to introduce the "Child Safe Internet Act of
1997."303 This Act would also provide parents with access screening
software, as well as create child-safe chat-rooms where it would be a
felony to post indecent material. 30 4
Reno H will also have a significant impact on past, present and
future legislation involving the Internet as well as other media.30 5
The main impact of the case will be the elimination of the concept
of indecency as a viable concept for regulating speech on the In-
ternet under the First Amendment.30 6 This may also have a ripple
effect, as Justice Stevens' opinion noted, which may lead to a similar
treatment of "indecency" concerning its application to the regula-
tion of other media as well.3 0 7 For example, because parents can
lock out programs that they do not want their children to see on
cable television, this medium would seem no more invasive than
the Internet, and could therefore be entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection. 30 8 Reno H has also set the standard in regards to
First Amendment protection provided to the Internet. The Court
set forth a distinction between the First Amendment protection
provided in cyberspace as compared to lesser protections that have
been provided to other media in prior Supreme Court cases.309
The holding in Reno H will play a part in shifting the burden of





305. See Goodale, supra note 299, at 1. Justice Stevens' opinion on the use of
the concept of "indecency" may be so powerful that it may effect the use of that
concept on other media as well. See id.
306. See id.
It is a fair guess that the regulation of indecency, as we have known it, on
the Net may very well be gone forever. Congress can regulate obscenity
on the Net as it can regulate it anywhere else, but it is going to have to be
ingenious to come up with a definition of indecency that is not substan-
tially the same as the definition of obscenity. This means indecency's life
as a concept separate from obscenity may be over.
Id.
307. See id.
308. See Goodale, supra note 299, at 1.
309. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of how the Court treated different
media differently when determining the amount of First Amendment protection
they should be provided.
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material over the Internet. The invalidation of the Act makes par-
ents responsible for protecting their children from the harms of
such material on the Internet.310 The decision also places a further
pressure on the industry to develop technology in the near future
that may be available to create "adult zones," thus lessening the ef-
fect of similar prohibitions. Internet companies are under constant
threat of new legislation if they do not develop and provide some
solutions.
Michaelj Merchant
310. But see Peters, supra note 269, at 366 (maintaining that one cannot as-
sume that all parents are interested in what children are doing, that parents have
overcome their fear of computers or that parents are informed of what types of
material are on Internet).
51
Merchant: Establishing the Boundaries of First Amendment Protection for Spe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
52
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/8
